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The Natural Law Basis
Obligation: International
and OPEC in Context

of Legal
Antitrust

Our Business is, to declare, how, chiefly for the Direction of the Will, a
certain Kind of Attributes have been impos'd on Things, and their
natural Motions; whence there springs up a peculiar Agreement and
Conveniency in the Actions of Mankind, a grateful Order and
Comeliness for the Ornament of human Life.'

ABSTRACT

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) stabilizes petroleum prices to promote the economic
prosperity of its member nations for which oil is a substantial
export. Price stabilization influences the price of petroleum
around the world, impacting the economies of developed and
developing countries. Under U.S. antitrustjurisprudence, the
OPEC quota agreements that stabilize prices would likely be
declared illegal, and other countries might also declare price
fixing to be illegal under their respective competition laws.
Several U.S. Senators have recently proposed that price
fixing should be illegal under internationallaw as well. This
Note avoids a superficial analysis of the status of international
antitrust law by exploring the ultimate basis of legal obligation
and situating antitrust in the context of natural law. This
Note's conclusion that OPEC should not be sued before the

1.
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO [OF
THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS IN EIGHT BOOKS] bk. I, ch. I, § 1I, at 2 (Basil
Kennett, D.D. trans., London 1729) (1672) (quotations from De Jure Naturae et
Gentium alter the letter 'T' from the original source to the letter "s," and citations
indicate the appropriate book, chapter and section of De Jure Naturae et Gentium,
along with the page number corresponding to this particular translation). The title
page refers to Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) as "Counsellor of State to his late
Swedish Majesty, and to the late King of Prussia" (Frederick III). Id.; PUFENDORF,
infra note 259, at xiii. Before his work for the Kings, King Charles XI of Sweden
appointed Pufendorf to a full professorship of natural and international law with the
Faculty of Law at the University of Lund. Id. at xii. Pufendorf later dedicated De Jure
Naturae et Gentium, his major work, to Charles XI who gave Pufendorf a barony in
1694. Id. at xii, xiii. De Jure Naturae et Gentium was "translated into every major
European language, reprinted innumerable times, and used as textbooks in dozens of
universities on the continent and in Scotland and the American colonies." J.B.
Schneewind, Pufendorf's Place in the History of Ethics, in GROTIUS, PUFENDORF AND
MODERN NATURAL LAW 199 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 1999). Other works by Pufendorf
are cited in this Note. See infra notes 226, 259.
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InternationalCourt of Justice is based upon implications of the
characteristics of the relationship between natural law and
human law, the footing of the world community on antitrust
matters, and the requirements for implementing fair and
consistent antitrustenforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION

United States Senator Arlen Specter made a floor statement on
July 19, 2001 about the possibility of legal action against the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to
decrease the price of petroleum. 2 Senator Specter was concerned with
OPEC's practice of entering into agreements to restrict oil production,
affecting the world market for oil by driving up its price.3 Senator
Specter and four other U.S. Senators together suggested two possible
lawsuits against OPEC and other conspiring nations, including a suit
in federal district court under U.S. antitrust law, 4 and a suit in the

2.
147 Cong. Rec. S7942-01 (daily ed. July 19, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Specter), reprinted in 27(7) INT'L L. & TRADE PERSP. 2 (July 2001) [hereinafter OPEC
and Antitrust Law].
3.
See id.
4.
Discussion of a lawsuit in U.S. district court is beyond the scope of this
Note, but the Senators opined that a revisiting of International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 565-69 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
is in order because OPEC action should more properly be characterized as
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on "the general principles
5
of law recognized by civilized nations.
To determine the responsibility of OPEC nations to other
sovereigns on principles of antitrust law, the basis of legal obligation
should be explored. Natural law explains the origin, nature, and
limits of obligation in a historically comprehensive and practical way,
and enables cogent analysis of the international law question
International antitrust enforcement has elicited
presented.
heightened concern in an increasingly connected world community
where business concerns more frequently involve legal questions that
transcend national borders, in which antitrust authorities
"communicate, co-operate, and co-ordinate their efforts to achieve
The
compatible enforcement results" in increasing measure. 6
international legal question posed by OPEC's practice of price fixing
is set forth in this Note, including discussion of U.S. antitrust law
and the recognition of competition principles around the world,
followed by a discussion of the natural law framework for legal
obligation that enables a conclusion.

"commercial" rather than "governmental" activity, which would remove OPEC's
protective shield under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). OPEC and
Antitrust Law, supra note 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994). The Senators' proposal is
in line with the intent of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Model Law on Competition, infra note 142, at 3, which defines "enterprise"
to include government-operated entities. Infra note 155; see also U.N. TDBOR, 6th
Sess., Agenda Item 6, Report of the Expert Meeting on Consumer Interests,
Competitiveness, Competition and Development (held Oct. 17-19, 2001) at 3, U.N. Docs.
TD/B/COM.1/43 & TDJB/COM.1/EM.17/4, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docsl
c1em17d4.en.pdf (recommending that enterprises "obey relevant laws and regulations
of the countries in which they do business") [hereinafter Report of the Expert Meeting
on Competitiveness (U.N. Trade and Development Board)]; The Set of Multilaterally
Agreed Equitable Principles,infra note 160, pt. IV § D, para. 1 ("Enterprises ...should
be subject to the competence of the courts and relevant administrative bodies [of the
countries in which they operate].").
5.
OPEC and Antitrust Law, supra note 2. The Senators also suggested
obtaining an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ)through the
U.N. Security Council. Id.
6.
John J. Parisi, Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities,
Speech Before the IBC UK Conferences Sixth Annual London Conference on EC
Competition Law in London, England (May 19, 1999) (Updated October 2000), § I, at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc99059911update.htm. Parisi serves as Counsel for
European Union Affairs in the International Antitrust Division of the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission. Id. at n.1.
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THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES

Currently, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) is composed of 11 countries 7 that together produce
approximately 40 percent of the world's oil and hold more than 77
percent of the world's proven oil reserves. 8 The first agreement
between OPEC nations reportedly took place in 1949 when
Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia met to "exchange
views" and to "explore avenues for regular and closer communications
between them."9 In response to the unilateral reduction in price of
Venezuelan crude oil in 1959, the First Arab Petroleum Congress was
convened in Cairo to establish an "Oil Consultation Commission." 10
OPEC was officially formed in 1960 in Baghdad, Iraq.1 1 Today, "The
Conference," composed of delegations headed by "Their Excellencies
the Ministers of Oil, Mines and Energy" of member countries, is the
"supreme authority of the Organization" that determines OPEC
12
policy and makes decisions regarding applications for membership.
Membership is open to nations with a "substantial net export" of
crude petroleum and nations with "fundamentally similar interests"
13
who "share the ideals" of member countries.
OPEC's "principle aims" include the "co-ordination and
unification of petroleum policies" of member countries and the
"determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests,
individually and collectively." 14 To safeguard their interests, OPEC
admits to actively seeking ways of "ensuring the stabilization of

7.
The founder members of OPEC include Iraq, Iran (accession in 1960),
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, and the other full member countries of OPEC
include, with year of accession noted in parenthesis, Algeria (1969), Indonesia (1962),
Libya (1962), Nigeria (1971), Qatar (1961), and United Arab Emirates (1967).
Organization of Pertroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Member Countries, at
http://www.opec.org; OPEC GENERAL INFORMATION, infra note 9, at 5, 12. Ecuador and
Gabon withdrew their OPEC memberships in 1992 and 1995 (respectively). EIA OPEC
Facts, infra note 8. Gabon's withdrawal in 1995 came after it adopted competition
legislation in 1989. See UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, infra note 142, at 9.
8.
Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: OPEC, at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/opec.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter EA
OPEC Facts]. See also Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, About
OPEC, at http://www.opec.org [hereinafter About OPEC].
9.
OPEC, GENERAL INFORMATION 5, available at http://www.opec.org/
Publications/GI/GenInfo.pdf [hereinafter OPEC GENERAL INFORMATION].

10.

Id.

11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 6.
13.
Id. at 11; About OPEC, supra note 8.
14.
OPEC GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 9, at 10, quoted in Int'l Ass'n. of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 558 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
The quotation cited is part of a Resolution of the First Conference. Id.
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prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful
and unnecessary fluctuations."'1 5 OPEC maintains a specialized
division named the "Economic Commission" to "assist[] the
Organization in promoting stability in international oil prices at
equitable levels."' 16 OPEC describes itself as composed of nations
"heavily reliant" on oil revenues as their main source of income, 17 and
consequently attempts to secure "a steady income" for member
nations.' 8
To achieve price stabilization in the oil market, OPEC nations
form agreements similar to the one reached in July 2001 that
involved reducing production by one million barrels per day, effective
September 1, 2001.19 In an OPEC meeting on September 27, 2001,
Dr. Chakib Khelil, President of The OPEC Conference and Algerian
Minister of Energy and Mines, said:
You will recall that, when price stability was threatened in July, we
took the decision to remove one million b/d from the market, with effect
from 1 September. This sent a positive signal to the market about the
seriousness of OPEC's intentions and met with immediate success,
because we put our credibility on the line. But our credibility is only as
good as the continuation of the effort among our Member Countries to
maintain cohesion, solidarity and cooperation, as happened in July. We
are prepared to act again, as and when necessary, in the interests of
market price stability, either as a full Conference or through informal
We shall reach a decision that
contacts among our Ministers ....
ensures adequate supplies at the $25/b market price, to the full
20
satisfaction of producers and consumers alike.

In the year 2001, OPEC agreed to reduce oil production four times to
increase prices. 21 Some sources have reported that OPEC has fixed
the actual prices for exports due to problems stemming from "quota

15.
OPEC GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 9, at 10-11.
16.
Id. at 10.
17.
About OPEC,supra note 8.
18.
OPEC GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 9, at 11, quoted in Int'l Ass'n. of
Machinists, 477 F. Supp. at 558. The goal of securing a steady income is stated as a
Resolution of the First Conference. Id.
19.
Press Release, OPEC, Agreement of the OPEC Conference (July 25, 2001),
at http://www.opec.org/ (News & Info, Press Release 17/2001).
20.
Press Release, OPEC, Opening Address to the 117th Meeting of the OPEC
Conference by His Excellency Dr. Chakib Khelil, President of the Conference and
Minister of Energy and Mines, Algeria (Sept. 27, 2001), at http://www.opec.org (News &
Info, Press Release 19/2001).
Energy Information Administration, World Oil Market and Oil Price
21.
Chronologies: 1970- 2001, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeulcabs/chron.html#a2001 (last
updated Jan. 2002) (compiling a world oil market and oil price chronology). OPEC
agreed to cut production on January 17, March 17, July 25, and December 28 in the
year 2001 for a total agreed production cut of five million barrels per day for the year.
Id.

248

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:243

cheating." 22 OPEC established a "price band mechanism" at its
March 2000 meeting that aims to stabilize the price per barrel
between $22 and $28.23 Any fluctuation outside of this six-dollar
24
range will prompt another quota agreement.
Venezuela Oil Minister Alvaro Silva said, "Nobody [among oil
producers] wants a price war. ' 25 Price wars drive down the cost of oil
to consumers, which is what happened in the global economic
downturn of 1998 when "internal bickering over production quotas
' 26
flooded the world with oil, sending prices crashing to $10 a barrel.
OPEC Secretary-General Ali Rodriguez commented, "If we compete in
times of difficulty, we will all lose something. ' 27 Since non-member
nations such as Russia, the world's second-largest oil producer
following OPEC member Saudi Arabia, can also influence the market,
OPEC tries to include other countries in agreements to cut production
levels. 28
In December 2001, OPEC reached a production cut
agreement for which it persuaded Russia, Norway, Mexico, Oman,
and Angola to reduce their production as well, effective January 1,
2002.29
Without such agreements, non-member nations such as
Russia can increase their market share when OPEC decides to cut
back production.3 0
Even when OPEC loses market share from
cutbacks due to non-member nation production, OPEC officials
believe the alternative is worse; Kuwait's Oil Minister Mr. al-Sabeeh
stated, "Long term, we are net gainers out of this. ' 31 Although OPEC
member nations profit from agreements that stabilize petroleum

22.
John W. Schoen, OPEC is in the Driver's Seat, for Now, but Cartel's Record
of ControllingPrices is Mixed, MSNBC NEWS, July 25, 2001, at http://www.msnbc.coml
news/605024.asp?cpl=l.
The precarious nature of negotiating pledges for oil
production is evident from the effects of OPEC internal dissention in 1998, infra text
accompanying note 26. Because nobody really knows how much oil exists, the most
reliable data being a "rough estimate" at best, even OPEC nations that have agreed to
reduce production have an incentive to slip extra barrels into their export inventories.
See Schoen, supra.
23.
EIA OPECFacts,supra note 8.
24.
Id.
25.
Alexei Barrionuevo, OPEC Cutback May Help Prices, Erode its Clout, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 31, 2001, at A3. On price wars, consider ROSS, infra note 43, at 117 ("By
'cheating' on an agreed upon price, firms may end up in a price war as vigorous as any
that would occur without a cartel.").
26.
Schoen, supra note 22.
27.
Barrionuevo, supra note 25.
28.
Id.
29.
EIA OPEC Facts,supra note 8.
30.
See Barrionuevo, supra note 25. In 2001, OPEC reduced production 20%
from year 2000 levels, while Russia boosted production by 500,000 more barrels per
day in 2001.
Barrionuevo, supra note 25.
The U.S. Energy Information
Administration predicts rising production levels for oil-producing countries that are not
OPEC member nations or parties to OPEC production restraint agreements. EJA
OPECFacts, supra note 8.
31.
Barrionuevo, supra note 25.
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prices, such agreements are probably illegal in countries such as the
United States.

III.

ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

In addition to his floor statement about legal action against
OPEC, Senator Specter wrote a letter with the support of Senators
Charles Schumer, Herb Kohl, Strom Thurmond, and Mike DeWine
addressed to the attention of President George W. Bush. 32 In that
letter, the Senators expressed particular concern for the agreements
entered into by OPEC and other oil-producing states to restrict
33
production in light of the energy crisis and high prices of OPEC oil.
The Senators referred to the agreements as "nothing more than an
old-fashioned conspiracy in restraint of trade which has long been
'34
condemned under U.S. law.
In the United States, antitrust law 35 is the body of law "designed
to protect trade .

.

''3 6
. from restraints, monopolies, [and] price-fixing.

37

The Sherman Act declares illegal "every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations," and
imposes strong punishments on offenders. 38 The Clayton Act also
provides a damages remedy for injuries arising from antitrust
39
violations, and also permits injunctive relief.
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, every agreement or regulation concerning trade
restrains trade by its very nature. 40 Therefore, as Justice Brandeis

32.

OPEC and Antitrust Law, supra note 2.

33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
For the purposes of this Note, "antitrust law" will be a term generally
interchangeable with "competition law," despite the possibility of non-antitrust issues
that might "conceivably be included under the rubric of 'competition policy."' James,
OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, infra note 95, at 6.
36.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (7th ed. 1999).
37.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
38.
15 U.S.C. § 1. An illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act is
considered a felony in the United States, and is punishable by "fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." Id.
39.
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. The Clayton Act provides for threefold recovery of
damages sustained as a result of injury from violation of antitrust laws (§ 15), and for
injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws" (§ 26).
40.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982) (explaining that
"Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the word 'every' [in the
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wrote, such a simple test as whether the agreement at issue restrains
trade cannot alone constitute the basis for determining the legality of
the contract. 4 1 The Court determined that the true test of legality is
"whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
'4 2
suppress or even destroy competition.
As the Chicago Board of Trade Court elucidated, an agreement
43
in restraint of trade is illegal if it restrains trade "unreasonably."
In 1906, the Chicago Board of Trade adopted a "call rule," whereby
members including brokers, merchants, dealers, millers, maltsters,
and manufacturers of corn products were prohibited from making
negotiations to purchase or arrive at a price for purchase of any
wheat, corn, oats, or rye after the closing of the call session until the
opening of the next day's call session.44 The agreement was that any
grain purchased after the call session and before the next one could
only be sold at the closing price. 45 The Court held that the Chicago
Board of Trade's call rule did not constitute an illegal restraint of
46
trade under the Sherman Act.
To arrive at its conclusion, the Court considered the particular
facts of the business restrained, the condition of that business before
and after the imposition of the restraint, and the actual and probable
nature and effect of the restraint. 47 The Court held that the actual
effect of the restraint was to stimulate-rather than suffocate-the
market. 48 By looking at the impact on competition and the industry
in such a way, the method of antitrust analysis referred to as the
49
"rule of reason" developed.
The rule of reason analysis used by courts since Chicago Board
of Trade can prove to be burdensome, because inquiring into the

Sherman Act]," which would prohibit every contract in restraint of trade), discussed in
ROSS, infra note 43, at 138-39.
41.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
42.
Id. at 238. This statement by Justice Brandeis is considered part of the
"classic statement of the rule of reason." Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 343
n.13 (1982). The remainder of Justice Brandeis' synopsis of the rule of reason is
reflected in the text accompanying note 47.
43.
STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 123 (1993) (summarizing
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
44.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 235-37.
45.
Id. at 237.
46.
Id. at 241.
47.
Id. at 238.
48.
Id. The Court noted, inter alia, that the call rule benefited the market by
bringing buyers and sellers into more direct relations, distributing the business in
grain among a larger number of merchants, eliminating the risks of a private market,
making the Chicago market more attractive to more people, and facilitating trading by
enabling merchants to more easily fulfill contracts. Id.
49.
Also playing a substantial role in the development of the rule of reason
analysis were Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See generally ROSS, supra note 43, at 125.
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many impacts of a challenged restraint can involve a high cost to
plaintiffs and the government. 50 The burden caused by the rule of
reason analysis prompted the development of a per se rule. 5 1 Under
the per se rule, a category of restraints may be deemed so anticompetitive in nature that it can be presumed illegal without an
elaborate analysis of the history, purpose, and effect of the
restraint. 52 The per se rule is applied in a case where the court, by
experience, can "predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn [the restraint]."53

The per se rule developed in the context of a price fixing 54
arrangement in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 55
The
defendants, 20 individuals and 20 corporations, occupied a
substantial percentage of the market for the manufacture and
distribution of "sanitary pottery" for use in "bathrooms and
lavatories. '56 The defendants combined and agreed to fix prices at a
' 57
designated level and sell the pottery only to "jobbers.
Despite the rule of reason analysis established by Chicago Board
of Trade, the trial court in Trenton Potteries submitted the case to the
jury upon the instruction that if it found the agreements at issue to
have occurred, it should return a guilty verdict. 58 The trial court
instructed: "The law is clear that an agreement on the part of the
members of a combination controlling a substantial part of an
industry, upon the prices which the members are to charge for their
commodity, is in itself an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade
and commerce. '59 In affirming the defendants' convictions under the
Sherman Act, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness

50.

ROSS, supra note 43, at 127.

51.
Id. at 127-28.
52.
Id.
53.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344. Price fixing, as discussed
below, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements are practices courts
have deemed illegal "in and of themselves." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), quoted in Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344 n.15.
54.
For the purposes of this Note, price fixing is discussed in the context of
"horizontal" agreements rather than "vertical" agreements.
Both lawyers and
economists refer to agreements among competitors at the same stage of production as
horizontal agreements, whereas vertical agreements involve firms at different levels of
production such as an agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer to control
resale price. ROSS, supra note 43, at 117 n.1; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1208 (7th ed.
1999). The proliferation of horizontal agreements monopolizing the market prompted
the enactment of the Sherman Act. Ross, supra note 43, at 117 (citing the original
Sherman Act).
55.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
56.
Id. at 393-94.
57.
Id. at 394.
58.
Id. at 395.
59.
Id. at 396.

252

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.243

or unreasonableness of the price fixing arrangement in Trenton
Potterieswas immaterial, 60 explaining:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the
elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether
reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to
fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today
may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable
price of to-morrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged
because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a
price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential
power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful
restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular
price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the
government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining
from day to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere
variation of economic conditions. Moreover, in the absence of express
legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction
making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of
business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices
are reasonable-a determination which can be satisfactorily made only
after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice
61
between rival philosophies.

Thus, although the instructions given to the jury circumvented the
rule of reason analysis of ChicagoBoard of Trade, the Court held that
such a detailed industry analysis was gratuitous in the context of the
price-fixing agreement because of the difficulty in monitoring price
reasonableness and the power exerted over the market with the
62
attendant potential for harm.
Then, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Court held
price fixing as a category to be per se illegal under the Sherman
Act. 63 The indictment charged major oil companies operating in the
Mid-Western area of the United States as having "combined and
conspired together for the purpose of artificially raising and fixing. . .
prices of gasoline ...at artificially high and non-competitive levels,
and at levels agreed upon among them and have thereby
intentionally increased and fixed ... prices."6 4
When small
independent refiners discovered a surplus of gasoline and had to sell
the excess at a distress sale price, 65 prices for all refiners were driven

60.
Id. at 401.
61.
Id. at 397-98, quoted in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 213-14 (1940).
62.
See Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. at 402.
63.
See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150. See generally ROSS, supra note
43, at 129-30.
64.
Id. at 166.
65.
Distress sale prices resulted from the following factors: (1) the
disproportionately large supply of gasoline relative to a smaller capacity to consume
(demand), due in large part to the discovery of the largest oil field in history in East
Texas in 1930, (2) the fact that, despite unprofitability, the small refiners could not
shut down because they could not afford to, because abandoned wells are exceedingly
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down-sometimes below the cost of production-which negatively
impacted the business of all competing refiners. 66 Congress and the
President attempted to remedy the situation to no avail.6 7 Price wars
ensued, entailing "cutthroat and self-defeating" competition, 68 and,
although some progress was made in attempting to stabilize the
volatile situation, no significant progress was made before the illegal
combination. 69
The defendants entered into a "gentleman's
agreement" in which the larger refiners would purchase the excess
supply from smaller refiners to prevent distress sales and stabilize
70
prices.
The Court held that any such combination "formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
is illegal per se. ''7 1 According to the Court, a violation of the Sherman
72
Act did not require fixing prices in a "uniform and inflexible" way.
The Court explained:
An agreement to pay or charge rigid, uniform prices would be an illegal
agreement under the Sherman Act. But so would agreements to raise
or lower prices whatever machinery for price-fixing was used....
Hence prices are fixed within the meaning of the Trenton Potteries case
if the range within which purchases or sales will be made is agreed
upon, if the prices paid or charged are to be at a certain level or on
ascending or descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or if by
various formulae they are related to the market prices. They are fixed
73
because they are agreed upon.

Reasoning that the Sherman Act would eventually be emasculated
should the Court accept "competitive evils" as a legal justification for
price-fixing, the Court identified protestations of "[rluinous
competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting," and good
intentions as typical excuses for price-fixing that cannot be appraised
without undermining the entire purpose of the Sherman Act. 74 The

difficult to bring back into operation and because of the probability of losing regular
customers, and (3) the fact that the small refiners did not have the storage capacity to
hold the surplus. See id. at 170-71. The result was "distress gasoline," which involved
selling "as fast as they made it" for whatever price obtainable. Id. Predictably, prices
dropped dramatically. See id.
66.
See id.
67.
See id. at 171-75.
68.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 346 (1982).
69.
See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 175-77.
70.
See id. at 177-81.
71.
Id. at 223.
72.
Id. at 222.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 220-21, 222. The Court acknowledged that fixed prices would not be
subject to "continuous administrative supervision and readjustment in light of changed
conditions." Id. at 221. Consider also the Court's reasoning in Trenton Potteries,supra
text accompanying note 61, where it noted the infeasibility of monitoring prices for
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prohibition on price fixing is strong enough to withstand even the
defense that the conspirators did not have the ability to control the
market, because by raising, lowering, or stabilizing prices the
conspirators interfere with the "free play of market forces," and such
agreements have been placed "beyond the pale" by Congress in an
'75
attempt to "protect[ ] that vital part of our economy.
The Court later summarized per se antitrust violations as
"agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use." 76 The benefits of a per se category as noted by
the Court include increased certainty of the law and avoidance of
complicated and prolonged, and often unproductive, economic
77
investigations into the industry at issue.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, the
Court was cautious about applying a per se analysis where the
restraint promoted a lawful purpose and thus contained some
"redeeming virtue. 78s The agreement approved by the Court involved
the issuance by American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) of blanket
licenses to Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), giving CBS
the right to perform the compositions as often as it liked for a
specified term, for negotiated fees. 79 The Court excepted to the
litigation arising from "efforts of the creators of copyrighted musical
compositions to collect for the public performance of their works, as
they are entitled to do under the Copyright Act ... and to make
possible and to facilitate dealings between copyright owners and
those who desire to use their music."8 0 Under Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society, the Court might still deem a price-fixing
agreement per se illegal despite the existence of a lawful purpose if

reasonableness day to day, along with changing economic circumstances. Those fixing
prices would be in a strategic position to dominate the market and "destroy or
drastically impair" the competitive system. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 221.
Therefore, the Court has been unsympathetic to the interposition of defenses of the
competitive evils discussed. Id. at 218, quoted in Arizona v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 345 (1982).
75.
Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 221.
76.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), quoted in Int'l
Ass'n. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 559 n.3 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).
77.
Northern Pac. Ry.Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
78.
ROSS, supra note 43, at 134 (construing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)). See also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (reiterating the "redeeming virtue" position).
79.
Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 1.
80.
Id. at 10.
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less restrictive means exist to achieve the lawful purpose.8 1 Pursuant
to Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., if an agreement does not
further a lawful purpose, the court should end the inquiry and deem
82
the price-fixing arrangement per se illegal.
Under this existing U.S. antitrust jurisprudence, OPEC would
not be able to allege a lawful purpose because the very reason for
OPEC's existence is to stabilize international oil prices, with an open
goal of coordination and unification of petroleum policies.8 3 In a U.N.
Trade and Development Board meeting, a group of experts made a
'8 4
thinly-veiled reference to OPEC as an "excuse for fixing prices.
The "harmful and unnecessary fluctuations"8 5 in the market OPEC
seeks to curtail, and the price wars OPEC seeks to avoid,8 6 are the
market forces that U.S. antitrust law protects. Whether OPEC
establishes a production quota for its members or actually sets a price
for petroleum sales,8 7 all such activity is considered "price-fixing"
under U.S. jurisprudence.8 8 OPEC's only defense for its price-fixing
activity is to "safeguard their interests, individually and collectively,"
which include securing a "steady income."8 9 Such defenses are akin
to the "ruinous competition" or "financial disaster" explanations
denounced by the U.S. Supreme Court as typical excuses for price
fixing arrangements. 90 Therefore, OPEC agreements would probably
receive per se condemnation in a U.S. court. However, a similar
condemnation by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would
present greater complexities than in a U.S. domestic context.

81.
ROSS, supra note 43, at 142 (construing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)).
82.
Id. (construing Catalano,446 U.S. at 646).
83.
See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. OPEC would also be unable
to claim "conscious parallelism" under U.S. antitrust law, where independent decisions
to raise prices are not condemned under the Sherman Act. See ROSS, supra note 43, at
158-59. Conscious parallelism occurs when a competitor has knowledge of another
competitor's decision to increase prices and independently decides to do the same.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (7th ed. 1999). In a perfectly competitive market, Ross
observed, all firms end up selling at the same price, and therefore parallel conduct is
consistent with both cartel behavior and competition. RoSS, supranote 43, at 161. The
critical difference between conscious parallelism and healthy competition is the
agreement between horizontal competitors to act together. The UNCTAD Model Law
on Competition, infra note 142, at 15 26 also permits parallel behavior if the conduct
"would be in [the firm's] own interest in the absence of an assurance that its
competitors would act similarly." But see infra note 120.
84.
See Report of the Expert Meeting on Competitiveness (U.N. Trade and
Development Board), supra note 4, at 6.
85.
Supra text accompanying note 15.
86.
E.g., supra note 25.
87.
E.g., supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
88.
See, e.g., supranotes 71-75 and accompanying text.
89.
Supra text accompanying notes 14, 18.
90.
Supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS OVER ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY

Enforcement of U.S. antitrust principles on an international
scale would present difficulties because of the various decisions that
can be made regarding antitrust enforcement based upon different
political goals or philosophical perspectives. The Senators recognized
that an action against OPEC before the ICJ would constitute a
"cutting-edge lawsuit, making new law at the international level." 91
Any new international law would have to account for what the U.S.
Supreme Court has acknowledged as "rival philosophies" behind U.S.
antitrust law, 92 and philosophies are likely to be even more varied
between nations. One author explained that
As legislative history and case law both disclose, the general objective
of the antitrust laws is the maintenance of competition. Competition
per se thus becomes a goal of the legal order. Yet, competition is not a
concept which defines itself; notions about the desirability of
competition may shape judgments about how the law should apply, at
93
least at its indistinct edges.

European Commission Commissioner Mario Monti noted well the
"variety of forms and expressions" that antitrust enforcement can
take. 94 U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice Charles James commented on the
"range and complexity of international antitrust issues. '95 James
recognized that "some of the procedural and substantive differences
among us do matter, to us as agencies, to the businesses whose
conduct we review, and to the consumers we serve. '96 He concluded
that such differences "cannot reasonably be expected to disappear
'9 7
solely through strong enforcement cooperation.

91.
OPEC and Antitrust Law, supra note 2.
92.
Supra text accompanying note 61 (quoting United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)).
93.
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 5, at 20
(1977).
94.
European Comm'n Comm'r Mario Monti, Opening Speech at the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Forum on
Competition
(Oct.
17,
2001),
at
2,
at
http://www.oecd.org/pdfMOOO190001MOOO19632.pdf [hereinafter Monti, Speech at the
Global Forum on Competition].
95.
Assistant U.S. Attorney General Charles A. James, Address before the
OECD Global Forum on Competition (Oct. 17, 2001), at 3, http://www.oecd.org/
pdf/M000l9000/M00019731.pdf
[hereinafter James, OECD Global Forum on
Competition Address].
96.
Id. at 7.
Some procedural differences between sovereigns include
differences of timing of premerger notifications, statutory timetables for decisions and
limits on the sharing of information. Starek, Remarks at International Antitrust
Conference, infra note 135, § II.
97.
James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 7.
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At the outset, antitrust scholars disagree on whether courts
should hear antitrust cases at all. "Chicago school" advocates favor
98
antitrust enforcement solely to achieve economic efficiency.
According to the Chicago school, if a court compared other
multifarious and competing goals in a type of balancing test under an
antitrust analysis, the process would grind against the proper role of
the non-elected judiciary in a democratic system, which may be
unsuited to "evolving major social policy."99 The opposing, more
traditional camp of antitrust thinkers note that courts routinely
balance competing interests, and properly do so in antitrust cases as
well, and opine that Congress can always correct imbalances when
required. 10 0 In the OPEC controversy, the debated issue would be the
competency of the ICJ to hear an international antitrust case that,
because of its global reach, would necessarily encompass political and
social implications and undertones having dramatic impact on the
world community, requiring a balancing test of a dimension
heretofore unrealized.
If the ICJ should hear antitrust cases, reasonable minds could
also disagree on whether a particular antitrust case should be heard,
based on the amount of faith placed in the market. The Chicago
school believes the market can correct itself to a large extent, and
therefore favors a limited role for antitrust law.' 01
Antitrust
traditionalists, however, prefer to prevent private parties from
restraining the market as much as possible to enhance the
marketplace. 10 2 In the case of OPEC, adherence to quotas equates to
increased market share for non-OPEC nations that are not coconspirators in OPEC deals, and quota cheating can disrupt OPEC
from the inside. 10 3 The prospect of the market solving the OPEC
problem on its own might discourage Chicago school thinkers from
bringing suit in the case of OPEC, but not so for traditionalists.
If the ICJ actually heard an antitrust case, assuming that the
ICJ should evolve major social policy and that natural market
processes would not provide a remedy, it would be confronted with
the complicated task of assessing the market effects of a particular
restraint. The most qualified experts are only able to suggest
tendencies, not probabilities, for the effect of a certain practice upon
the market. 10 4 As Professor Ross observed, the "true economic effect

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

ROSS, supranote 43, at 2.
Id. (quoting Judge Robert Bork).
Id.
Id. at 1, 3.
Id. at 1.
See supra notes 22, 26, 30, and accompanying text.
ROSS, supranote 43, at 2.
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of many business practices is impossible to determine." 10 5 Even for
the price-fixing by OPEC, it is impossible to determine how much oil
has actually been held back, 10 6 much less what effect that oil would
have had upon the market price for oil if it had been released
according to the dictates of the market.
The recently-proposed merger between General Electric (GE)
and Honeywell illustrates the potential intractability of assessing the
market. The proposed merger would have resulted in the ability for
the merged firm to offer higher quality products at reduced prices, as
compared with each firm operating on its own. l0 7
The U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) approved the merger, but the European
Commission lead by Commissioner Monti blocked the transaction
despite having access to the same facts as the DOJ and despite
extensive coordination between the agencies.' 0 8
U.S. Assistant
Attorney General James reflected, "I do not think we could have
worked together more closely," but the agencies nevertheless arrived
at "glaringly inconsistent decisions."' 1 9 As James observed, the
European Commission blocked the merger because it believed
competitors would be adversely affected by the higher quality and
reduced prices resulting from the merged company, which, in turn,
would drive some competitors from the market because of their
inability to compete. 110 However, James noted, antitrust law protects
competition and consumers rather than competitors,"' and antitrust
law exists "not to protect business from the working of the market; it
is to protect the public from failure of the market." 112 Analyst
Michael Regan commented, "The European Union seems to be
3
focusing more on the concerns of competitors.""1
However, the European Commission was probably looking out
114
for consumers as much as the DOJ, on the basis of oligopoly theory.

105.
Id.
106.
See, e.g., supra note 22 (noting that the most reliable data of oil production
is a "rough estimate" at best).
107.
James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 4.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. See also EU Kills GE-Honeywell, infra note 113 (quoting Michael Regan,
Credit Suisse First Boston analyst, who commented, "It's a fundamental difference'). But
see also Starek, Remarks at International Antitrust Conference, infra note 135, § II (listing
several successful instances of U.S.-E.C. cooperation).
110.
James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 4.
111.
Id. (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
112.
James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 4
(citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)). See also Report
of the Expert Meeting on Competitiveness (U.N. Trade and Development Board), supra
note 4, at 9 (pointing out that competition law and policy is intended to protect
competition rather than competitors).
113.
EU Kills GE-Honeywell, CNN MONEY, July 3, 2001, at http://money.cnn.com/
2001/07/03/europelge eulindex.htm.
114.
Oligopoly is defined as "[clontrol or domination of a market by a few large
sellers, creating high prices and low output similar to those found in a monopoly."
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Oligopoly theory posits that markets composed of few sellers are
insufficiently competitive to force prices down to a competitive
level, 115 meaning that firms can maintain prices above competitive
levels without an agreement to fix prices. 116 In an oligopoly, new
firms pose a minimal threat of entering into the market, which
translates into a disincentive for firms to cut prices to attract more
business. 117 Market share remains nearly the same whether a firm
increases or decreases its prices, despite brief fluctuation, because its
competitors can always imitate the move. 118 Decreasing prices would
equal less revenue with a nearly identical market share, but when a
"price leader" raises its prices, its competitors can either do the same
to increase their own revenue or wait for the price leader to bring its
price back down. 119 The competitors know that they can maintain a
higher-than-competitive pricing level without losing market share
because their market hegemony eliminates worries of new firms
entering the market to offer competitive pricing, acquiring market
share, and driving competitor prices back down. 120 Consumers are
exploited because of the excessive market power and price discretion
in the hands of oligopolists, and an oligopoly might operate much like
121
a price-fixing cartel.
The apprehension of the European Commission over the GEHoneywell merger appears to have stemmed from oligopoly
principles, but U.S. actors were not so worried. Although all schools
of antitrust thought would disapprove of a merger that resulted in an
oligopolistic market structure, 12 2 the disagreement probably took root
in whether an oligopoly scenario would in fact result from the

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (7th ed. 1999). A monopoly is characterized by
"[c]ontrol or advantage obtained by one supplier or producer over the commercial
market within a given region." Id. at 1023. Judge Learned Hand added that "[ninety
percent] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four
per cent is enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not." Id. (quoting United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)).
115.
ROSS, supra note 43, at 318.
116.
Id. at 159.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.

See id. Competitors in an oligopolistic market structure, as long as they
120.
make no agreement to raise prices, are not precluded from selling at higher than
competitive price levels, which can be squared with conscious parallelism discussed in
note 83. See also ROSS, supra note 43, at 159 ("[W]ithout proof of an agreement ... this
type of oligopolistic behavior may not fall within the language of § 1 [of the Sherman
Act]."). But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (7th ed. 1999) (noting that consciously
parallel activity might be viewed as evidence of an underlying conspiracy).
121.
ROSS, supra note 43, at 159, 318. As a result, some commentators have
suggested that action must be taken against oligopolistic market structures. Id. at 159
(referencing Donald Turner).
122.
Id. at 318.
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proposed merger. In other words, the DOJ and the European
Commission might have differed on how many firms the market
needed in order to maintain competitiveness. 12 3 GE and Honeywell
formally terminated the merger deal on October 2, 2001 after word
from the European Commission that the merger would create a
company with too much market power. 124 European Commision
Commissioner Monti said in a statement, "The merger between GE
and Honeywell ...

would have severely reduced competition in the

aerospace industry and [would have] resulted ultimately in higher
prices for customers, particularly airlines. '125 The DOJ, based on its
GE issued a statement
experience, doubted that assertion. 126
explaining, "We strongly disagree with the commission's conclusions
about the competitive effects of GE's acquisition of Honeywell ...

[w]e

believe this acquisition would have clearly benefited consumers in
terms of quality, service and prices." 127 At bottom, the European
Commission and the DOJ did not disagree on whether consumers
ought to be protected, but on how best to protect them. Multiple
answers might exist, particularly given the imprecision of assessing
market effects, and the increased difficulty of analyzing and assessing
larger economic systems. The ICJ would be required to select a single
answer that would apply to all interested sovereigns.
After a court attempts to assess the market effects of a particular
restraint, a court must assign a point at which it can justifiably
circumscribe private interests. 128 Upon a continuum of harm, the
judge must decide the point at which the restraint's destruction to the
market is great enough to justify a declaration of illegality. Such a
judgment call entails another judgment call about the proper level of

123.
Professor Ross advanced two competing theories for determining the point
at which a market transitions from a competitive market to an oligopoly: the "age"
theory and the "virginity" theory. Id. at 319. Similar to growing older, under the age
theory a market becomes progressively less competitive as the number of firms
decreases. Id. Under the virginity theory, the market either has enough firms to be
competitive or it does not. Id. Most economists apparently adhere to the latter theory
because if the number of firms becomes too small, firms can collude easier and more
secretively and smaller numbers of firms permit a more accurate prediction of what the
market will do, bringing it closer to an oligopolistic arrangement. Id. But even when
one theory is selected, wide disagreement exists as to what number of firms is required
to avoid the problems attendant to an oligopolistic market. Id.
124.

GE/Honeywell

Declared

Dead,

CNN

MONEY,

Oct.

2,

2001,

at

http://money.cnn.com/200l/lO/02/deals/ge-honeywell.
125.
EU Kills GE-Honeywell, supra note 113.
E.g., James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95,
126.
at 5 (responding to the proposition that inefficient rivals might be driven from the
market: "Our experience, however, is that business rivals rarely go quietly into the
Instead, they typically respond by lowering their own costs and prices,
night.
competing harder to survive.").
EU Kills GE-Honeywell, supra note 113.
127.
128.
ROSS, supra note 43, at 2.
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protection to extend economic rights. 129 Conventional wisdom holds
that "the right to maximize profits does not deserve the kind of
judicial protection reserved for those rights expressed or implied in
the Bill of Rights," and most people believe government should be
able to more-rigorously regulate business affairs. 130 While it is clear
that economic freedoms should receive less protection than
humanitarian freedoms, the actual amount of protection that
economic rights deserve is often unclear. 131 Policy-based judgment
calls such as these might vary across different countries, and even
across different courts.
The potential points of disagreement discussed above "reflect
conflicting ideologies, opposed visions of human nature, market
relationships, and the proper role of the state,"'132 creating factions in
antitrust thinking. Lord Wilberforce remarked, "It is axiomatic that
in antitrust matters the policy of one state may be to defend what it is
the policy of another state to attack.' 133 John J. Parisi, Counsel for
European Union Affairs in the International Antitrust Division of the
Federal Trade Commission, highlighted the way in which antitrust
laws differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, making an analogy to tax,
employment, and environmental law variances where a violation in
1 34
one jurisdiction may not be a violation in another jurisdiction.
FTC Commissioner Starek commented that even if two nations share
common goals of maximizing consumer welfare and allocative
efficiency, "politics and national policy objectives may dictate marked
differences between the enforcement priorities of the two countries'
antitrust systems."'1 35 For over five decades, proposals have been
made to develop an antitrust code with uniform global application
that would be enforceable by the WTO, but such proposals have not
come to fruition. 136
U.S. policymakers are skeptical about
implementing a uniform international antitrust code because they
question "whether agreement can be reached on a sufficiently
stringent set of antitrust policies."'1 37 Untethering antitrust from the

129.
See generally id.
130.
Id.
131.
See id.
132.
William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins ofAntitrust Policy, 66
TUL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991).
133.
Parisi, supra note 6, at 142 n.1 (citing Lord Wilberforce).
134.
Id. at 133.
135.
Roscoe B. Starek, III, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement
and Other International Antitrust Developments, Remarks at the Business
Development Associates, Inc. Antitrust 1997 Conference, § III (Oct. 21, 1996), at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/stareklbdaspc96.htm
[hereinafter Starek, Remarks at
International Antitrust Conference]. At the time of the address, Starek was serving as
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
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designated approaches of individual sovereigns would require
consensus on policy matters that appear to be hopelessly variable.
Still, the dramatic increase in transnational activity in recent
years signals the importance of international cooperation,1 3 8 and the
DOJ and the FTC communicate with foreign antitrust authorities
almost daily. 139 Despite political and ideological differences, Parisi
optimistically suggested that similarities between competition laws
are actually greater than differences, 140 and the rapid advance of
competition policy around the world seems to support his claim.

V. THE RAPID ADVANCE OF COMPETITION POLICY WORLDWIDE

Despite the various difficulties that can stymie international
antitrust cooperation, globalization has exerted enormous pressure to
come together on antitrust issues in recent years. The Senators opine
that the stage is set for development of new international law, 14 1 but

the Senators are not the only proponents of competition policy.
Today, competition legislation has been adopted in at least 67
countries and is pending in at least 19 other countries, and 10 other

countries have established antimonopoly committees. 142

Therefore,

138.
Parisi, supra note 6, at 133.
139.
Id. Bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements and mutual legal assistance
treaties are examples of the types of contacts between U.S. agencies and foreign
agencies. See infra note 213 1.
140.
Parisi, supra note 6, at 133.
See, e.g., infra note 430 (discussing
Venezuela's competition laws, which resemble U.S. laws in their aims).
141.
OPEC and Antitrust Law, supra note 2.
142.
The statistics are derived from a list of countries, set out below, that have
competition legislation, pending competition legislation, or antimonopoly committees.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Model Law on Competition:
Draft Commentaries to Possible Elements for Articles of a Model Law or Laws, at 9-10,
U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.5/7 (2000) (Series on Issues in Competition Law and Policy),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//tdrbpconf5d7.en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD
Model Law on Competition].
OECD countries adopting competition legislation include (with year of initial
adoption indicated parenthetically): Australia (1974), Austria (1988), Belgium (1991),
Canada (1889), Czech Republic (1991), Denmark (1997), European Union (1957),
Finland (1992), France (1977), Germany (1957), Greece (1977), Hungary (1996),
Ireland (1991), Italy (1990), Japan (1947), Luxembourg (1970), Mexico (1992),
Netherlands (1997), New Zealand (1986), Norway (1993), Poland (1990), Portugal
(1993), Republic of Korea (1980), Spain (1989), Sweden (1993), Switzerland (1985),
Turkey (1994), United Kingdom (1890), and the United States (1890). Non-OECD
countries with competition legislation include the African nations of Algeria (1995),
C6te d'Ivoire (1978), Gabon (1989), Kenya (1988), Malawi (1998), Mali (1998), Morocco
(1999), Senegal (1994), South Africa (1955), Tunisia (1991), United Republic of
Tanzania (1994), Zambia (1994), and Zimbabwe (1997); Asian and Pacific nations of
China (1993), Fiji (1993), India (1969), Indonesia (1999), Pakistan (1970), Sri Lanka
(1987), Taiwan (1992), and Thailand (1979); transitional nations of Bulgaria (1991),
Croatia (1995), Lithuania (1992), Mongolia (1993), Romania (1996), Russian
Federation (1991), Slovakia (1994), and Slovenia (1991); and Latin American and
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approximately 96 sovereigns intend to implement competition
principles in their respective countries. 143 These 96 sovereigns are
located all over the world in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, North
America, Central America and the Caribbean, South America,
Europe, and Australia. 144 Still, the development is very recent,
because over half of the countries with competition legislation
adopted the legislation in the 1990s. 14 5 The fact that only 15
sovereigns had competition legislation before 1980 indicates an
146
explosion of competition law in recent decades.
Part of this explosion might be influenced by the efforts of the
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in generating
awareness among developing countries of the adverse effects of
restrictive business practices upon their economies and working with
them to implement competition laws. 147 The United Nations formed

Caribbean nations of Argentina (1980), Brazil (revised 1994), Chile (1973), Colombia
(1992), Costa Rica (1992), Jamaica (1993), Panama (1996), Peru (1990), and Venezuela
(1991). Id.
The following nations have pending legislation or antimonopoly committees:
African nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Mauritius, and
Togo; Asian and Pacific nations of Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Viet Nam;
transitional nations of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; and Latin
American and Caribbean nations of Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago. Id.
See id. The statistics relied upon are from 2000, and at least 13 to 23 more
143.
nations may have since enacted legislation or taken other action. See, e.g., Kondo,
Remarks at the Global Forum on Competition, infra note 176, para. 10 (mentioning
that as of 2001, more than 80 countries had competition laws in force); James, OECD
Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 2 (mentioning that as of 2001,
over 90 countries had some type of antitrust law, and 20 more countries were drafting
antitrust laws).
The only continent not represented as having
144.
See supra note 142.
competition legislation is Antarctica, where such legislation does not currently appear
to be necessary.
The dates each country enacted competition legislation are listed in note
145.
142, from which these statistics are deduced. At least 38 countries out of the 67 with
competition legislation have enacted the legislation since 1990. See supra note 142.
Ten countries with competition laws at least revised their policies in the 1990s. See
supra note 142. Thus, 48 of the 67 countries (72%) with competition laws established
or modified such laws in the 1990s. See supra note 142. If the antimonopoly
committees were all established in the 1990s, then 78 of the 96 countries (81%)
observing some sort of antitrust policy in 2000 had established or modified their policy
in the 1990s. See supra note 142. As mentioned in note 143, between 13 and 23 more
countries might have established competition policy or taken further steps on it since
the statistics cited were released in 2000, which would further increase the percentage
of activity occurring since 1990.
146.
See supra notes 142, 145. See also James, OECD Global Forum on
Competition Address, supra note 95, at 2 (explaining that there has been "explosive
growth in the number of countries with antitrust laws and agencies").
147
Rubens Ricupero, Statement to the OECD Global Forum on Competition,
para. 9 (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://webnetl.oecd.org/pdfM00019000[M00019635.pdf
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UNCTAD in 1964 as a specialized intergovernmental body of the U.N.
General Assembly to deal with trade, investment, and development
issues. 148
The UNCTAD mission is to maximize trade and
development opportunities for developing countries to help them
integrate into the world community and to confront challenges
related to globalization. 14 9 UNCTAD provides technical assistance
and advisory and training programs for developing countries and
countries in transition with experts from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank, and the
WTO. 150 For consultation matters, UNCTAD also organizes annual
meetings of an Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition
Law and Policy. 151 And finally, UNCTAD continues to publish a
"Model Law on Competition," discussed below, with commentary on
152
approaches followed by various competition laws.
The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the
FTC have also contributed to the explosion of global awareness of
antitrust issues. 153 The DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC have
sent representatives to advise countries on six continents for a total of
almost 250 missions in the last decade, and have hosted foreign
1 54
antitrust officials to explain U.S. policy.
UNCTAD's Model Law on Competition seeks "to control or
eliminate restrictive agreements, or arrangements among enterprises
...or abuse of dominant positions of market power, which... unduly
restrain competition, adversely affecting domestic or international
trade or economic development. 1 55 In particular, the Model Law
prohibits agreements between "rival or potentially rival firms,
regardless of whether such agreements are written or oral, formal or
informal" that "fix[] prices or other terms of sale, including in
international trade. '156 According to the Model Law commentary,
price fixing is a common form of restrictive business practice and one

[hereinafter Ricupero, Statement to the Global Forum on Competition]. Ricupero is the
Secretary-General of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. Id.
148.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), About UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/en/aboutorg/aboutorg.htm.
149.
United Nations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
http://www.un.org/partners/civilsociety/m-trade.htm (listing the UNCTAD mandate).
150.
Ricupero, Statement to the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 147,
para. 10.
151.
Id. para. 12.
152.
UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, supra note 142; Ricupero, Statement
to the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 147, para. 11.
153.
James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 3.
154.

Id. at 3.

155.
UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, supra note 142, at 3. The Model Law
defines "enterprises" broadly to include virtually any entity "controlled by private
persons or by the State," and defines a dominant position of market power as a position
to control the relevant market for a good or service. Id.
156.
Id.
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of the anti-competitive practices most likely to lead to an
investigation. 157 The commentary points out that some countries
that have recently amended their competition laws have denoted
price fixing as a per se violation, as it is in the United States. 158 Like
U.S. law, the Model Law also includes production quotas in the
159
category of price fixing, subject to per se analysis.
The Model Law is based in large part upon "The Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control
of Restrictive Business Practices" (Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles). 160 The U.N. General Assembly convened the
U.N. Conference on Restrictive Business Practices under the auspices
of UNCTAD in 1978.161 The Conference on Restrictive Business
Practices completed and approved the Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles in 1980, and the U.N. General Assembly adopted
them the same year. 162 Four U.N. Conferences to Review All Aspects
of the Set have taken place in 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000.163 The
Fourth Review Conference again reaffirmed the validity of The Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and called upon all U.N.
Member Nations to "implement the provisions of the Set"'1 64 although
it is not legally binding. 165
Considered the "sole multilateral

157.
Id. at 16, para. 34. See also id. at 15.
158.
Id. at 41 n.63.
159.
Id. at 16, para. 35.
160.
See id. at 11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 33. The provision at issue in this Note, quoted
in the text accompanying note 156, derives from The Set of Multilaterally Agreed
EquitablePrinciples. Id. at 14.
Enterprises, except when ...

they are under common control ...

or otherwise

not able to act independently of each other . . . should refrain from practices
such as the following when, through formal, informal, written or unwritten
agreements or arrangements, they limit access to markets or otherwise unduly
restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on
international trade, particularly that of developing countries, and on the
economic development of these countries.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Set of Principlesand Rules on
Competition, pt. IV, § D, para. 3, U.N. Doc TD/RBP/CONF/10Rev.2 (2000), at
http://www.consumer.org.hk/20020416/unctad/webpagebackdoclset-pri.pdf [hereinafter Set
of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles]. The provision lists "[a]greements fixing
prices, including as to exports and imports" as disapproved practices. Id.
161.
Id. pt. I, para. 1.
162.
Id. (citing a U.N. resolution).
163.
Id.
164.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Conference to Review of All
Aspects of The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. TDBOR, Agenda Item 1, U.N. Doc.
TD/RBP/CONF.5/15 (Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
tdrbpconf5d 15.en.pdlf.
165.
Ricupero, Statement to the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 147,
para. 7.
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instrument of a universal character dealing with this area, ' 166 The
Set's provisions apply to transnational enterprises operating in more
than one country that adversely affect international trade,
167
particularly that of developing countries.
The existence and involvement of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) also demonstrates the reach
of competition policy worldwide. The OECD currently has 30 member
nations. 168
Since the early 1980s, the OECD has featured a
Competition Law and Policy Committee (CLP Committee) that is "the
world's premier source of policy analysis and advice to governments
on how best to harness market forces in the interests of greater global
economic efficiency and prosperity." 169
The CLP Committee
encourages decisionmakers to take action against anti-competitive
practices and regulations. 170 In addition, the OECD's Competition
Division provides analytical papers, sector studies, and policy
recommendations to the CLP Committee. 17' The OECD attempts to
affect "efficient, competition-friendly economic regulation," and
1 72
recently has focused upon "tougher enforcement against cartels."'
The OECD objective in focusing on "unnecessary" restraints of
competition is "to make market principles the cornerstone of
173
government policy.'
The OECD held the first Global Forum on Competition in Paris
on October 17-18, 2001, emphasizing the importance of a competitive
international market. 174
The Forum was designed to help
governments
develop
frameworks
for encouraging efficient
competition while deterring abuses. 175 Present at the Forum were

166.
Id.
167.
Set of MultilaterallyAgreed Equitable Principles,supra note 160, pt. IV, §
B(ii), para. 1.
168.
OECD nations include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Member Countries, at http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/
0,3380,EN-countrylist-0-nodirectorate-no-no-159-0,FF.html.
169.
OECD, About Competition Law and Policy, at http://www.oecd.org/oecd/
pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-about-7 1-3-no-no-no-71,FF.html.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
OECD, Global Forum on Competition - 17-18 October 2001: Keynotes, at
http://webnetl.oecd.org/oecd/pageshome/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-71-3-no21-7537-71,FF.html (providing transcripts of the keynotes) [hereinafter OECD Global
Forum on Competition keynotes].
175.
Press Release, OECD, OECD Organizes First Global Forum on Competition
(Sept. 10, 2001), at http://webnetl.oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/displaywithoutnav/
0,3376,EN-document-notheme-l-no-no-18881-0,00.html. In addition to the 30 member
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representatives from the World Bank, the WTO, and the
International Bar Association, among others. 176
The Forum
177
represented a cooperative effort between UNCTAD and the OECD,
and 55 countries from every part of the world were represented. 1 78
On February 14-15, 2002, the OECD held the second Global Forum
on Competition in Paris, where experts and officials from more than
60 countries discussed what "action is needed for developing
economies to implement effective competition laws and how to
179
promote international co-operation in anti-trust investigations."'
On April 27, 1988, the OECD issued a Recommendation
suggesting that its member nations "ensure that their competition
laws effectively halt and deter hard core cartels. 18 0 A decade later in
1998, the OECD Council adopted another Recommendation (1998
Recommendation) proposing effective measures to take against hard
core cartels. 8 1 "Hard core cartel" was defined as any anticompetitive
82
agreement to fix prices or establish output restrictions or quotas.'
The 1998 Recommendation referred to hard core cartels as the "most
egregious" violations of competition law, and disapproved of raising
prices and restricting supply, "making goods and services completely

nations and the "observers" to the OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee
(including Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Lithuania, and Russia), the OECD also invited
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Egypt, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Latvia, Malaysia,
Morocco, Peru, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Chinese Taipei, Thailand,
Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zambia. Id.
176.
OECD Deputy Sec'y Gen. Seiichi Kondo, Opening Remarks at the Global
Forum on Competition, para. 1 (Oct. 17, 2001), at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/
M00019000/M00019624.pdf [hereinafter Kondo, Remarks at the Global Forum on
Competition]. Other groups present at the forum included the Business and Industry
Advisory Committee, Consumers International, several regional organizations, about
20 invited economies (listed in note 175), five observer nations to the OECD CLP
Committee (also listed in note 175), and the 30 OECD member nations (listed in note
168). Kondo, Remarks at the Global Forum on Competition, supra, para. 1.
177.
Ricupero, Statement to the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 147,
para. 2.
178.
James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 2.
179.
Press Release, OECD, OECD Global Forum on Competition to Focus on
Developing Country Needs, Paris, 14-15 February 2002 (July 2, 2002), at
http:/webnetl.oecd.org/oecdlpagesfhome/displaygenerall0,3380,EN-document-71nodirectorate-no-12-25813-2,FF.html.
The second Global Forum on Competition
invited the following nations that did not attend the first Forum: Algeria, Cameroon,
Gabon, Hong Kong China, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tunisia, and Vietnam. Id.; see also
supra note 175. Algeria is a member of OPEC, and Gabon withdrew its membership
from OPEC in 1995. Supra note 7.
180.
OPECand Antitrust Law, supra note 2.
181.
See generally OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective
Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 921st Sess., OECD Doc. C(98)35/FINAL (1998),
available at http://www.oecd.org/pdfJMO0018000IMO018135.pdf [hereinafter OECD
1998 Recommendation].
182.
Id. at 3.
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unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily expensive for
others."

83

OPEC nations are probably guilty of the "most egregious"
violations of competition law according to the OECD. Because OPEC
nations supply at least one-third of the 77 million barrels per day of
oil consumed by the world market and restrict the supply of that vital
natural resource to raise petroleum prices, OPEC probably falls into
But the OECD
the OECD "hard core cartel" category. 18 4
Recommendation, by its own terms, applies only to membernations
and merely "invites" non-member countries to "associate themselves
with this Recommendation and to implement it."' 18 5 No OPEC nation
is an OECD membernation, l86 so the OECD Recommendation does
not bind OPEC nations. Nevertheless, the world has moved toward
recognizing competition policy on a large scale, and the Senators
claimed international consensus on the illegitimacy of price fixing
based on "respect for and adherence to fundamental international
principles and norms.

1 87

VI. PRINCIPLES BEHIND COMPETITION LAW

One of the fundamental principles recognized internationally is
the apprehension over excessive power, and the concomitant
The U.S.
esteeming of fairness, liberty, equality, and justice.
Supreme Court's uneasiness over excessive power can be gleaned
from reading landmark antitrust opinions such as United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., where the Court characterized the price fixing
agreement as per se unreasonable and unlawful.' 88 Stephen Ross
summarized antitrust law as "not about economics, but about
power."'

89

The concern over excessive power is not confined to the economy,
but accounts for one of the most fundamental principles in the U.S.
Constitution. 190 In The Federalistpapers, James Madison stressed
the need for a government structure that separates powers. Tyranny,

Id. at 2.
183.
See Barrionuevo, supra note 25; see also supra notes 19-28 and
184.
accompanying text.
OECD 1998 Recommendation, supra note 181, at 4.
185.
See supra notes 7, 168. The OECD did, however, extend invitations to
186.
OPEC member nations Venezuela and Indonesia for the first OECD Global Forum on
Competition held October 17-18, 2001, probably because both countries have enacted
competition legislation. See supra notes 142, 175.
187.
OPECand Antitrust Law, supra note 2.
See supra text accompanying note 61 (quoting United States v. Trenton
188.
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)).
189.
ROSS, supra note 43, at 1 (emphasis modified).
See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
190.
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as Montesquieu also explained, is the result of the accumulation of
legislative, executive, and judicial power in the hands of a single
entity, whether composed of one person or many, and whether elected
or appointed. 191 According to Madison, the preservation of liberty
requires the separation of the three main classes of government
power, without which there arises a "universal reprobation of the
192
system."'
Preserving liberty by checking excessive power protects equal
opportunity and fairness, and therefore justice as well. Even the
most powerful parties are benefitted by having concern for weaker
parties, as Madison explained:
In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily
unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as
in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against
the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the
stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their
condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as
well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful
factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a
government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the
19 3
more powerful.

A society seeking liberty and justice also seeks protection of weaker
factions from the will of stronger factions. 194 Devices to resist the
encroachment by one branch of the government upon another branch
are necessary because men are not angels, and angels do not govern
men, or such controls would be unnecessary. 195 Madison wrote that
justice is the end of government and the end of civil society, and it
"ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until
1 96
liberty be lost in the pursuit.'

191.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 48
(James Madison) ("In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are
placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly
regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for
liberty ought to inspire."). The United States features the following balance of power
between state and federal governments and their coordinate branches:
[T]he power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time
that each will be controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
192.
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
193.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
194.
See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
195.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
196.
Id.
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Creating opposite and rival interests as a check on excessive
power are "inventions of prudence" for the distribution of
governmental power, but might also be "traced through the whole
system of human affairs, private as well as public. ' 197 Apprehensions
over excessive power also arise in economic matters, and antitrust
law operates as an opposite and rival check on excessive power by one
particular economic entity, securing equal opportunity for citizens
who cannot secure it themselves. OPEC member nation Venezuela
began a "free competition regime" in 1992 that attempts to minimize
abuses of dominant market positions. 198 The U.S. Supreme Court in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. observed that the framers of
the Sherman Act intended to embody a "charter of freedom" with
antitrust laws. 199

As can be demonstrated by the Indonesian experience, the same
"universal reprobation of the system" that would result from a
tyrannical government also results where an economy is controlled
only by the most powerful-where equal opportunity and fairness
cannot not be attained. Dr. Didik Rachbini, Commissioner for the
Indonesian Commission for Business Competition, shared Indonesia's
experience with economic change at the second OECD Global Forum
on Competition. 200 The "New Order regime" in Indonesia, since 1965,
20 1
has been characterized by the main goal of economic development.

197.
Id.
OECD Global Forum on Competition, Venezuela's Free Competition System,
198
at
2002),
(Mar. 14,
CCNMIGF/COMP/WD(2002)37
Doc.
OECD
at
2,
Venezuela's Free
[hereinafter
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00028000/M00028255.pdf
Competition System]. Venezuela submitted this paper as a contribution to the first
OECD Global Forum on Competition, held October 17-18, 2001. Id. See also supra
note 142 (listing Venezuela as having enacted competition legislation in 1991).
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). The
199.
Court also noted in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)
that
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster.
Id.
Dr. Didik J. Rachbini, Political Economy of Business and Competition
200.
Issues in Indonesia, Presentation Before the OECD Global Forum on Competition, at 2,
available at
2002),
11,
(Feb.
Doc.
CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2002)28
OECD
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00026000fM00026177.pdf [hereinafter Contribution from
Indonesia at the Second OECD Global Forum on Competition]. Dr. Rachbini is a
professor and Vice Rector at Universitas Mercu Buana in Jakarta, and serves as
Comissioner of the KPPU (Commission for Business Competition) in Indonesia. Id. at
201.

Id. at 4-5.
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However, the goals of the New Order were substantially hindered by
the lack of "economic equity."20 2 At his address to the Forum,
Rachbini repeatedly highlighted the lack of equity and justice in the
economy, referring to unfair monopoly practices, mixing of private
and public domains, highly leveraged firms, and the effects of3
20
collusion, corruption, and wastefulness in the economy.
Approximately 15 years ago, Indonesia began to discuss the
importance of fair business competition because unfair business
practices stifled their economic goals. 20 4 However, government actors
in power prevented development of competition policy, having
20 5
personal interests in the mixing of government and business roles.
The power structure preventing the development of anti-monopoly
and competition law collapsed in 1998, allowing the new government
led by President Habibie to reform the economic system. 20 6 In 1999,
Indonesia enacted competition legislation to promote "more fairness
in business competition. 20 7
As OPEC member nation Indonesia has experienced, checking
excessive power benefits everyone because sustainable economic
development ultimately depends upon fair business practices, even on
the international level. 208 The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles explains that anti-competitive practices are "likely to have
adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of developing
'20 9
countries, and on the economic development of these countries.
The objectives of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles include, inter alia, (1) attaining greater efficiency in

202.
Id. at 5.
203.
Id. at 5-8.
204.
Id. at 7-8.
205.
Id.
206.
Id. at 8.
207.
Id.
See also supra note 142 (listing Indonesia as having enacted
competition legislation in 1999).
208.
See Report of the Expert Meeting on Competitiveness (U.N. Trade and
Development Board), supra note 4, at 3 (commenting that properly implemented
competition policy can make a key contribution to sustainable development); Kondo,
Remarks at the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 176, para. 3 (noting that a
competitive market is "now widely recognised as the only viable means to create
sustainable economic efficiency and growth").
209.
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles, supra note 160, pt. IV
§ D, para. 3. The distinguished keynote speakers at the first OECD Global Forum on
Competition emphasized the importance of competition policy in providing equal
opportunity for all nations to achieve economic prosperity, and highlighted the
"creation of dominant positions, cartels and abuses of market power" as the problem
with which competition policy is concerned. Monti, Speech at the Global Forum on
Competition, supra note 94, at 1, 2, 4; OECD Global Forum on Competition keynotes,
supra note 174. See also OECD 1998 Recommendation, supra note 181, at 2 (decrying
the "distortion" of world trade by hard core cartels, creating "market power, waste, and
inefficiency in countries whose markets would otherwise be competitive").

272

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL 36.'243

international trade and development, particularly in developing
countries, (2) protecting and promoting social welfare and the
interests of consumers in all countries, (3) eliminating disadvantages
to trade and development resulting from restrictive business
practices, and (4) maximizing benefits of international trade for
developing countries. 210 By checking excessive power and ensuring
fairness and equal opportunity, the competition laws of various
individual sovereigns have facilitated economic liberty and yielded
positive economic results, 211 and the question remains whether
enforcement is appropriate on an international scale.

VII.

THE NATURAL LAW BASIS OF LEGAL OBLIGATION

With concern for the power wielded by OPEC and the resultant
increase in oil prices, the Senators recommended a groundbreaking
action against OPEC before the ICJ.2 12 In their letter to President
Bush, the Senators suggested that OPEC is obligated to other
countries not to fix oil prices based on the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," specifically delineated in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice as a permissible
basis for decision. 2 13 Whether OPEC nations are responsible to other

210.
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles, supra note 160, pt. IV
§ A(2)-(4).
211.
See OECD Global Forum on Competition keynotes, supra note 174.
212.
See OPECand Antitrust Law, supra note 2.
213.
Id.; BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (Ian Brownlie ed.,
2002). Some writers have disagreed over whether the general principles are precepts
of positive law or precepts of natural law. See, e.g., DEGAN, infra note 250, at 14-15.
Regardless of technicalities, the general principles tend to point to natural law. The
ability of diverse societies to conclude similarly on a matter indicates, as a matter of
common sense, that there must be a larger blueprint for human interaction responsible
for the similarity. Although universal approval does not necessarily point to natural
law, discussed in note 349 of this Note, Grotius observed that natural law might be
proved a posteriori when all, or at least the more civilized nations, recognize the point:
"For a universal effect requires a universal cause: now such a universal belief can
hardly have any cause except the common sense of mankind." GROTIUS, infra note 233,
bk. I, ch. I, § XII,
1, at 5. See also infra note 265 (regarding the common sense of
natural law); Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (Eng. C.A. 1883) ("The logic of inductive
reasoning requires that where two major propositions lead to exactly similar minor
premisses there must be a more remote and larger premiss which embraces both of the
major propositions."). The existence of even one general principle tends to point to
natural law as the common motivation for wide recognition.
Pursuant to the Statute of the ICJ, the Court may decide a case before it on four
other grounds, detailed below. Each ground for decision is an investigative tool for
determining natural law (as discussed in note 349), the ultimate source of legal
obligation:
(1) "[International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States." BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra,at 319. The United States has entered into "bilateral antitrust cooperation
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agreements" with Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Commission, Germany,
Israel, Japan, and Mexico, and the language of such agreements approximates a 1967
OECD Recommendation, modified most recently in 1995, encouraging countries to
cooperate in enforcement of antitrust laws under the principles of sovereignty and
comity. Parisi, supra note 6, at 134; Starek, Remarks at International Antitrust
Conference, supra note 135, § II; James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address,
supra note 95, at 3. See also SPENCER WEBER WALLER & JEFFREY L. KESSLER,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 12.07, at 12-30 to 12-30.1 (1992)
(detailing the U.S. agreement with Japan as an example of the typical terms). The
United States has also entered into "mutual legal assistance treaties" (MLATs) with at
least 40 other countries. James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra
note 95, at 3. The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA), Pub.
L. No. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994), authorizes the FTC and the DOJ to negotiate
bilateral agreements with other countries that permit each country to obtain
confidential information to enhance the efficacy of investigations. Starek, Remarks at
International Antitrust Conference, supra note 135, § II; see also Parisi, supra note 6,
at 135.
Pacta sunt servanda,the duty to observe agreements and stipulations contained in
treaties, derives from natural law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (7th ed. 1999)
(translating pacta sunt servanda literally as "agreements must be kept"). Locke
considered the duty as one of the two factors upon which human society in its entirety
rests, but "it is not to be expected that a man would abide by a compact because he has
promised it, when better terms are offered elsewhere." LOCKE, infra note 231, ch. I, at
119 (citing Pufendorf). See also PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. II, ch. III, § XX, at 143.
For altho' the Usefulness and Expediency of [compacts] be clearly apparent, yet
this bare Consideration could never bring so strong a Tie on Mens Minds, but
that they would recede from these Rules, whenever a Man was pleas'd either to
neglect his own Advantage, or to pursue it by some different Means, which he
judg'd more proper, and more likely to succeed ....
[T]he meer Force of human
Command seems insufficient to invest these Dictates with the Power of
Obligation. For since no such Command could take Place otherwise than by
the Intervention of Covenants, and since Covenants owe all their Strength to
some Law, it doth not appear how there could arise any human Sovereignty
capable of Obligations, unless the Dictates of Reason were before-hand receiv'd
for Laws.
Id. Grotius observed that it is "conformable to Natural Law to observe compacts,"
because "some mode of obliging themselves was necessary among men, and no other
natural mode could be imagined." GROTIUS, infra note 233,
15, at xxvii. See also
PUFENDORF, infra note 226, § 2, at 148:
For even if some multitude not bound to one another by supreme command
should entirely agree with one another upon certain formulae for living
together, still this would be in vain, if a supreme command had not yet been set
up, through whose force the disobedient could be restrained by punishments.
For this agreement would have no other force than that which, on the basis of
the law of nature, inheres in pacts.
Id.
(2) "[I]nternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 319. International custom is the
"main process in which rules of general international law arise, modify and terminate."
DEGAN, infra note 250, at 179. Several issues arise in recognizing custom as law,
including (1) the extent of "general practice" necessary to bind all actors, (2) whether
silence should be construed as acquiescence to the customary rule (most scholars
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countries for upholding principles of antitrust law, as the Senators
charge, ultimately depends upon the nature of obligation in the
international system. As will be explained, natural law is the root of
all legal obligation, including obligation in the international system,
and a thorough examination of the epistemology of natural law
international
regarding
considerations
important
reveals
enforcement of antitrust principles.
A. The NaturalLaw Framework
The big picture is important to conceptualizing the natural law
framework of legal obligation. St. Thomas Aquinas construed natural
law in the context of four distinguishable categories of law, including

answer in the affirmative), (3) whether a "persistent objector" to the custom could be
immune from it, and (4) whether the practices have been established around the world
for sufficient time to constitute a customary rule. Id. at 182, 185; see also supra notes
142, 168, 175, 179 (indicating the extent of "general practice" of antitrust policies);
supra notes 142-46 (giving statistics that reveal the recency of recognition of antitrust
policy around the world); infra note 426 (noting that antitrust law is still a "new thing"
for Indonesia, as it is for other sovereigns). Recognizing customary practices as settled
legal rules has been described as a "slow, continuous and progressive," and often
mysterious (Sir Humphrey Waldock) process. DEGAN, infra note 250, at 185.
The utilization of natural law is evident in forming a customary rule. When a
particular entity makes a decision on a matter-among the many decisions required to
form a customary rule-that entity makes the decision based on many smaller
decisions of fairness. In the aggregate, the customary rule eventually formed is the
result of a large group of such decisions over a long period of time by many different
entities who all scrutinize the facts and issues to arrive at what they believe to be the
best solution. Through trial and error, the customary rule is often the most sensible,
rational and fair method of handling similar situations, and natural law is utilized
27, at xxx ("[N]o one
throughout the process. See also GROTIUS, infra note 233,
readily joins himself to those whom he believes to think lightly of right laws and good
faith."). But see infra note 349 (noting that consent does not create natural law).
(3) "[J]udicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." BASIC
DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 319. Grotius wrote that Jus Gentium,
the Law of Nations, "is proved in the same manner as the unwritten Civil Law, by
constant usage, and the testimony of those who have made it their study. It is, as Dilo
Chrysostom says, the invention of life and of time. And here the best historians are a
2, at 6. Highly
great help to us." GROTIUS, infra note 233, bk. I, ch. I, § XIV,
qualified representatives from the U.N., WTO, OECD, DOJ, FTC, and the various
other competition authorities and antitrust agencies throughout the world could
perhaps qualify as a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." See
BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 319. Under the natural law
framework, this basis for decision can be considered a method for incorporating right
reason into the ICJ's analysis. See infra discussion accompanying notes 337-52.
(4) Upon consent of the parties, the Court may also decide a case ex aequo et bono,
which means, "according to what is equitable and good," and a judge given the power to
decide ex aequo et bono may rely entirely on equitable principles rather than legal
BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 319; BLACK'S LAW
rules.
DICTIONARY 581 (7th ed. 1999). See also infra note 294 (discussing equity and its close
realtionship to natural law).
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(1) eternal law, (2) divine law, (3) natural law, and (4) human positive
law. 2 14
William Blackstone, Hugo Grotius, Baron Samuel von
Pufendorf, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes all acknowledged similar
categories of law, 215 and Jerome Frank wrote, "I do not understand
how any decent man today can refuse to adopt, as the basis of modern
civilization, the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative to
'2 16
human conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas.
2 17
The first type of law, eternal law, equates to divine wisdom.
Aquinas wrote that because God created the whole world, the whole
community is governed by divine reason, 218 and the divine intellect is
"the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it
represents the Divine intellect ... [which] is true in itself; and its
type is truth itself. '2 19 He further noted, "the very Idea of the
government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature
of a law. ' 220 Moreover, that law "which is the Supreme Reason
cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and
eternal; ' 221 and thus the title of eternal law.

214.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 91 arts. 1-5, at 996-1000

(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1948); id. QQ. 93-95, at 1003-17.
Aquinas wrote Summa Theologica between 1224 and 1274 A.D. All material cited to
Aquinas is from volume one, in the first part of the second part (Part I-II) of Summa
Theologica, and may be found in
QUESTIONS 90-97 (1996).

THE TREATISE

ON LAW: SuMMA THEOLOGICA,

215.
Aquinas wrote centuries before all of these authors, but all provided
valuable discussions on natural law. E.g. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *42
(distinguishing natural law, the law of revelation and human law); id. at *38-40
(discussing divine wisdom and the independent actions of the Creator); id. at *40
(describing eternal law and natural law); GROTIUS, infra note 233, 48, at xxxvi, 37,
at xxxiii, & bk. I, ch. I, § XIII, at 6 (distinguishing natural law, human law and positive
divine law); id.
11-12, at xxvi (ascribing natural law to God, and paralleling the
concept of eternal law); PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. VI, § XVIII, at 76
(discussing divine law, human law and natural law, and acknowledging the existence
of God); LOCKE, infra note 231, ch. I, at 109 (describing the influence of God and
natural law); id. at 119 (explaining positive civil laws); id. ch. II, at 123 (mentioning
divine revelation); HOBBES, infra note 242, at 189 (discussing divine positive law, and
human positive law); id. at 149 (describing natural law and the separate existence of
God).
216.
JEROME FRANK, Preface to Sixth Printing of LAW AND THE MODERN MIND,
at xx (1963). See also M.B. Crowe, The "Impious Hypothesis". A Paradox in Hugo
Grotius?, in GROTIUS, PUFENDORF AND MODERN NATURAL LAW 3 (Knud Haakonssen

ed., 1999)
understood
217.
218.
219.
220.
Pufendorf,
lawgiver).
221.
omitted).

("[Clontemporary approaches to the natural law are conditioned by and
in the light of the history of the idea.").
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 93 art. 1, at 1003.
Id. Q. 91 art. 1, at 996; id. Q. 93 art. 1, at 1003.
Id. Q. 93 art. 1, at 1004.
Id. Q. 91 art. 1, at 996. See also infra note 258 (citing Blackstone,
Locke, and Austin, who explained that a law always implies a superior
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 1, at 996 (quoting Augustine) (italics
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Divine law, Aquinas explained, is part of eternal law as revealed
to men in the Scriptures, and includes the Old Law and the New
Law. 222
Blackstone cited the "benign interposition of divine
providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, and
the blindness of human reason, has been pleased, at sundry times
and in divers manners, to discover and enforce its laws by an
immediate and direct revelation," which "doctrines thus delivered"
223
Blackstone called the revealed or divine law of the scriptures.
Natural law, Aquinas' third type of law, also "partake[s]
somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being
imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their
proper acts and ends."224 The relationship between the Creator and a
created human being is characterized by the obligation of the inferior
being "to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his
conduct. '2 25 The Creator's will for a created thing is expressed in

222.
Id. Q. 91 art. 5, at 999. See also GROTIUS, infra note 233,
48, at xxxvi
('The books written by men inspired by God, or approved by them, I often use as
authority, with a distinction between the Old and the New Law."); HOBBES, infra note
242, at 189 (describing divine positive law, commandments of God given by those
"whom God has authorized to declare them," as one category of positive law). The Ten
Commandments as revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai, which is part of the Old
Testament in Exodus 19-20, have multiple identities. PUFENDORF, infra note 226, § 8,
at 153:
This much, indeed, is certain: in so far as they are viewed as laws promulgated
by God through the instrumentality of Moses for the Jews, they are in fact civil;
because God himself in that commonwealth performed also the function of a
civil legislator, and those precepts had there in every way the force of civil laws,
punishment, which it was in the hands of the magistracy to exact, being
provided against transgressors. But when those laws are considered with
reference to their substance, as they necessarily harmonize with the condition
of human society, and so obligate all men, even apart from their promulgation
by Moses, they are in fact laws of nature.
Id.
223.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *41-42.
224.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 2, at 997. The apostle Paul was
perhaps the first to articulate the imprint of divine law on creation, writing in A.D. 57.
"[W]hat may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to
them." Romans 1:19. Paul further explained. "For since the creation of the world
God's invisible qualities-his eternal power and divine nature-have been clearly seen,
being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse." Romans
1:20.
225.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *39. Similarly, Locke discussed the
"right which the Creator has over His creation," noting that all obligation leads back to
God to whom "we are bound to show ourselves obedient to the authority of His will."
LOCKE, infra note 231, ch. VI, at 183. See also PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. I, §
III, at 3-4 ("[The Almighty God], by his Right of Creation, hath the Power of
circumscribing, within proper Limits, that Liberty of Will with which he indulg'd
Mankind, and when it grows refractory, of turning it which way soever he pleaseth, by
the Force of some threatned Evil."). We are so bound "because both our being and our
work depend on His will, since we have received these from Him, and so we are bound
to observe the limits He prescribes; moreover, it is reasonable that we should do what
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certain laws of nature. As Pufendorf wrote, "He who is the author of
the whole of nature, is the author of nature's laws. '22 6 Blackstone

shall please Him who is omniscient and most wise." LOCKE, infra note 231, ch. VI, at
183. Locke further noted the power of God and human dependence where "God has
created us out of nothing and, if He pleases, will reduce us again to nothing: we are,
therefore, subject to Him in perfect justice and by utmost necessity." Id. at 187. See
also Isaiah 64:8 ("We are the clay, you are the potter; we are all the work of your
hand."); Jeremiah 18:6 ('0 house of Israel, can I not do with you as this potter does?'
declares the LORD."); Isaiah 45:9 ("Woe to him who quarrels with his Maker, to him
who is but a potsherd among the potsherds on the ground. Does the clay say to the
potter, 'What are you making?"'); Romans 9:20-21 ("Does not the potter have the right
to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for
common use?").
226.
2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS
LIBRI Duo [ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE IN Two BOOKS] § 10, at 154

(James Brown Scott ed., William Abbott Oldfather trans., Oxford 1931) (1660) (all
citations to Elementorum JurisprudentiaeUniversalisare from the indicated section of
the "Definition XIII" (definition of a law) chapter of book I, unless otherwise indicated,
and page numbers correspond to this particular English translation). See also HOBBES,
infra note 242, at 190 (noting that natural law is "undoubtedly God's law"); 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *41 (mentioning that the law of nature is dictated by
God himself). Pufendorf considered the existence of God to be a critical factor in the
validity of natural law (which is described in the text accompanying notes 259-60), and
explained:
Of all the notions which everyone must hold about God, the first is a settled
conviction that God exists ...on whom this universe depends. This has been
most plainly demonstrated by philosophers ... [and claiming] not to
understand these arguments is no excuse for atheism. For since this conviction
has been a constant possession of the whole human race, anyone who wished to
overthrow it would not only have to produce a solid refutation of all the
arguments which prove God's existence, but also come forward with more
convincing reasons for his own position.
PUFENDORF, infra note 259, bk. I, ch. IV, § 2, at 39-40. Grotius stated that natural law
principles are valid whether or not they originated with God or nature, but strongly
affirmed that God is the author:
And what we have said would still have great weight, even if we were to grant,
what we cannot grant without wickedness, that there is no God, or that he
bestows no regard on human affairs. But inasmuch as we are assured of the
contrary of this, partly by reason, partly by constant tradition, confirmed by
many arguments and by miracles attested by all ages, it follows that God, as
the author of our being, to whom we owe ourselves and all that we have, is to
be obeyed by us without exception, especially since he has, in many ways,
shewn himself both supremely good and supremely powerful.
GROTIUS, infra note 233,
109:

11, at xxvi. Consider also LOCKE, infra note 231, ch. I, at

Since God shows Himself to us as present everywhere and, as it were, forces
Himself upon the eyes of men as much in the fixed course of nature now as by
the frequent evidence of miracles in time past, I assume there will be no one to
deny the existence of God, provided he recognizes either the necessity for some
rational account of our life, or that there is a thing that deserves to be called
virtue or vice.
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aptly described nature's laws, beginning with the inception of the
universe. Laws, he explained, signify rules of action, whether they be
laws of motion, laws of gravitation, laws of optics, laws of mechanics,
laws of nature, or laws of nations. 2 27 When the Supreme Being
formed the universe, he "impressed certain arbitrary laws for its
228
direction" upon matter, from which the subjects can never depart.
Blackstone continued:
The whole progress of plants, from the seed to the root, and from thence
to the seed again; - the method of animal nutrition, digestion, secretion,
and all other branches of vital economy; - are not left to chance, or the
will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary
manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great
229
creator.

Pufendorf conceived of the status of man similarly:
All the Beings which compose this Universe, as they consist of such
Principles as were by the most wise Creator temper'd and fitted for the
producing of each particular Essence; so they have every one of them
their particular Properties,arising from the Disposition and Aptitude of
their Substance, and exerting themselves in agreeable Actions,
according to that Portion of Strength which their Divine Author and
Founder hath imprinted on them. These Propertieswe now usually call
natural, since the Term Nature hath been extended so far, as to denote
not only the general Mass of Things, but also the Modes and Acts
flowing from the internal Force of their Constitution, by which is
produc'd that infinite Variety of Motions which turns and manages all
the Business of our World.
Those Things which exercise their
Operations, either without any Sense at all, or with pure down-right
Sense, or with such as is assisted by very imperfect Reflection, are
guided by the sole Instinct of Nature, and are unable to govern their
230
Actions by any Rules or Modes of their own Invention.

Locke paralleled Blackstone and Pufendorf, noting the senselessness
of conceiving of man as without a plan to his existence,
for it is by His order that the heaven revolves in unbroken rotation, the
earth stands fast and the stars shine, and it is He who has set bounds
even to the wild sea and prescribed to every kind of plants the manner
and periods of germination and growth; it is in obedience to His will

Id.
227.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *38.
228.
Id. Blackstone noted that, although the rules set by the Creator are said to
be arbitrary, which is a necessary ability due to the Creator's nature as "a being of
infinite power" with the ability to prescribe "whatever laws he pleased to his creature,"
the Creator is also "a being of infinite wisdom," such that he has "laid down only such
laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things
antecedent to any positive precept." Id. at *40. These "things antecedent," Blackstone
explained, are "the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator
himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to
discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions." Id.
229.
Id. at *38-39.
230.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. I, § II, at 2.
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that all living beings have their own laws of birth and life; and there is
nothing so unstable, so uncertain in this whole constitution of things as
not to admit of valid and fixed laws of operation appropriate to its
nature-it seems just therefore to inquire whether man alone has come
into the world altogether exempt from any law applicable to himself,
23 1
without a plan, rule, or any pattern of his life.

Later Locke answered his own question, writing "it does not seem
that man alone is independent of laws while everything else is
bound. '2 32 In fact, Grotius described the truth of the things that
belong to natural law as readily apparent, and
notions, so certain, that no one can deny them, without doing violence
to his own nature. For the principles of such Natural Law, if you
attend to them rightly, are of themselves patent and evident, almost in
the same way as things which are perceived by the external senses;
which do not deceive us, if the organs are rightly disposed, and if other
233
things necessary are not wanting.

Natural law constitutes the blueprint for the existence and purpose
of, and interaction between, humans.
Obligation springs from natural law because of the free will of
mankind. Pufendorf defined obligation as "an operative moral quality
by which some one is bound to furnish, allow, or endure
something."234 Locke defined obligation similarly as "the bond of law
whereby one is bound to render what is due," further defining the
"bond of law" as "the bond of natural law whereby one is bound to
discharge a natural obligation, that is, to fulfil the duty which it lies

231.
JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE ch. I, at 109 (W. von Leyden ed.,
Oxford 1954) (1664). Locke originally wrote Essays on the Law of Nature in Latin, shortly
after 1660, but never published the essays. Id. at v.
232.
LOCKE, supranote 231, ch. I, at 117. Locke wrote:
[A] manner of acting is prescribed to him that is suitable to his nature; for it
does not seem to fit in with the wisdom of the Creator to form an animal that is
most perfect and ever active, and to endow it abundantly above all others with
mind, intellect, reason, and all the requisites for working, and yet not assign to
it any work, or again to make man alone susceptible of law precisely in order
that he may submit to none.
Id.
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS [ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE]
233.
39, at xxxiii-xxxiv (William Whewell trans., Cambridge 1853) (1625) (page numbers from De
Jure Belli et Pacis cited with roman numerals indicate material from the Prolegomena). De
Jure Belli et Pacis is considered "one of the most influential books in the history of the
natural law." M.B. Crowe, The '7mpious Hypothesis'" A Paradox in Hugo Grotius?, in
GROTIUS, PUFENDORF AND MODERN NATURAL LAW 4 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 1999).
Moreover, most scholars trace the beginning of thought on international law to this work by
Grotius. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER R. Rossi, JAMES BROWN Scor AND THE ORIGINS OF
MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at vii (1998).
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, bk. I, def. XII, at 71. See also PUFENDORF,
234.
supra note 1, bk. I, ch. VI, § V, at 60.
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upon one to perform by reason of one's nature. '235 The obligation to
render what is due can only exist if the subject might not render what
is due. Humans, as opposed to plants and animals, have such a
choice. Marcus Tullius Cicero observed that mankind "was endowed
236
by the supreme god with a grand status at the time of its creation.'
"[O]f all types and varieties of animate creatures," Cicero noted, man
alone "has a share in reason and thought, which all the others
lack. ' 23 7 The ability to reason extends a certain liberty to humans, as
Pufendorf explained:
But Man, who besides his excellent Form and most accurate Contexture
of Body, fitting him for the noblest and the quickest Offices of Life and
Motion, is endu'd with a singular Light of Understanding, by the Help
of which he is able most exactly to comprehend and to compare Things,
to gather the Knowledge of Obscurities from Points already settled, and
to judge of the Agreement which Matters bear to each other; and hath
also the Liberty of exerting, suspending, or moderating his Actions,
23 8
without being confin'd to any necessary Course and Method.

Blackstone also described man as "the noblest of all sublunary beings,
a creature endowed with both reason and freewill. ' 23 9 The liberty to
exert, suspend, or moderate action creates moral obligation to act
pursuant to the proper acts and ends designated by nature, for man

235.
LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. VI, at 181.
236.
1 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS
113 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., Cambridge 1999) (54-51 B.C.). Regarding mankind's
distinguished status, see Genesis 1:26-30, which recounts the creation of man in God's
own image, God giving him the power to rule over the fish of the sea, the birds of the
air, the livestock over all the earth and all the creatures that move along the ground,
and further giving man every seed-bearing plant on the face of the earth for food.
237.
1 CICERO, supra note 236, at 113 (observing also that man is "provident,
perceptive, versatile, sharp, capable of memory, and filled with reason and judgment").
See also GROTIUS, supra note 233,
6, at xxiv (describing man as an "animal of an
excellent kind," differing from other animals by a desire for society and a life spent
tranquilly); id.
9, at xxv (describing man as superior to other animals in social
impulses, judgment and power of estimating advantages and disadvantages, which
leads to the ability to understand future good and ill and what is congruous to human
nature to follow); LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. I, at 117 (reflecting on the work of the
Creator, endowing man "abundantly above all others with mind, intellect, reason, and
all the requisites for working").
238.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. I, § II, at 2. See also id. bk. I, ch. VI, §
VI, at 61.
As to Man's being capable of receiving Obligation,one Reason how he comes to
be so is, because he is endu'd with Will, which can turn to either Side, and so
guide itself by a moral Rule; unlike those other Beings which by some
intrinsical Constraint are determin'd to one and the same Way of acting.
Id. Although man is not confined to any necessary course or method, "Almighty GOD
•..would not that Men should pass their Life like Beasts, without Culture and without
Rule; but that they and their Actions should be moderated by settled Maxims and
Principles." Id. bk. I, ch. I, § III, at 3.
239.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *39.
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cannot rightly do otherwise, 240 as Aquinas observed quoting a verse
from Romans:
Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things
required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do
not have the law, since they show that the requirements of the law are
written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and
241
their thoughts now accusing, now even defending them.

Thus, Hobbes wrote that natural laws "have been laws from all
eternity, and are called not only natural,but also moral laws. '242 The
attributes of natural law are moral because "the Manners and the
Actions of Men are judg'd and temper'd with relation to them; and do
hence assume a Face and Habit different from the horrid Stupidity of
the dumb Creation. '243 Moral fundamentals are often referred to
under a natural law framework as "principles," which are the
"fundamental laws of nature. ''244
Natural law requirements
perpetually obligate humans "in the sense that there neither is, nor
can be, a time when the law of nature orders men, or any man, to do
something and he is not obliged to show himself obedient. '245 In
summary, according to Grotius, natural law is the "Dictate of Right
Reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or disagreement
with the rational and social nature of man has in it a moral turpitude
or a moral necessity; and consequently that such act is forbidden or
commanded by God, the author of nature. 2 4 6

240.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. VI, § V, at 60.
241.
Romans 2:14-15, quoted in AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 2, at 996-97.
See also LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. I, at 117 ('"[N]o one who commits a wicked action is
acquitted in his own judgement' [and thus] the sentence which everyone passes on
himself testifies that there is a law of nature.").
242.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (1651).
243.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. I, § II, at 2.
244.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 16, at 159. Ronald Dworkin defined a
principle as "a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a
requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." DWORKIN,
infra note 380, at 22. However, observing natural law is required for a just and
peaceful society, which ultimately does produce economic, political, and social
situations that are desireable and in accord with the human purpose, even if one must
forego immediate gratification. See discussion accompanying notes 317-27. Yet,
Dworkin correctly pointed out that the rationale for observing natural law is for
natural law's sake itself; the benefits follow.
245.
LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. VII, at 193. See also supra note 224 (quoting
the apostle Paul).
246.
GROTIUS, supra note 233, bk. I, ch. I, § X,
1, at 4, (notations by the
translator omitted). Grotius related that "he has prohibited the perverse aberrations of
our affections which draw us this way and that, contrary to our own interest and the
good of others; putting a bridle upon our more vehement passions, controlling and
restraining them within due limits." Id.
13, at xxvi. Consider also C.S. Lewis:
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Human positive law accounts for Aquinas' fourth type of law,
"afterwards added at the Pleasure of Men, as they found it expedient
to bring them in, for the polishing and the methodizing of common
Life. ' 24 7 Hobbes explained positive laws as "those which have not
been from eternity; but have been made laws by the will of those that

have had the sovereign power over others; and are either written, or
made known to men, by some other argument of the will of their

legislator. ' 24 8 Humans are naturally social and political beings that
live in community, and human law "should be framed, not for any
private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens," 249 said
250
Aquinas, such that they can exist in a common social life together.
As Blackstone explained, if man lived unconnected to other
251
The dictates of
individuals, human law would be unnecessary.

natural law could be enough to hold society together if everybody
followed them by the strength of their character, but nobody has
reason to imagine that "a bare Reverence of the Law of Nature ...
252
could ever have been able to secure the whole Body of Mankind.
The end of civil laws, Pufendorf explained, "is to have men held to the
performance of something by a tighter bond than natural obligation,

to wit, by the addition of a penalty to be inflicted upon us in a human

court of law by men having, as it were, authority over us," which
authority has the power to "reduce [the recalcitrant] to order. ' 253 As
Aquinas mentioned, man has a "natural aptitude for virtue; but the

These, then, are the two points I wanted to make. First, that human beings, all
over the earth, have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain
way, and cannot really get rid of it. Secondly, that they do not in fact behave in
that way. They know the Law of Nature; they break it. These two facts are the
foundation of all clear thinking about ourselves and the universe we live in.
C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 21 (Simon & Schuster 1996) (1943). See also infra
note 271 (discussing the effects of the fall of man).
247.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. I, § III, at 3.
HOBBES, supra note 242, at 189.
248.
249.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 96 art. 1, at 1017 (quoting Isidore).
See V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1997) (discussing
250.
Aquinas).
1 BLACKSTONE, supranote 215, at *43.
251.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. VII, ch. I, § VIII, at 632. See also AQUINAS,
252.
supra note 214, Q. 95 art. 1, at 1013.
And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good
natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training
suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved,
and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such
to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might
desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by
being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto
they did from fear, and thus become virtuous.
Id.
253.

PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 2, at 148.
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perfection of virtue must be aquired by man by means of some kind of
training. '254 Human law also attempts to delineate proper responses
to specific situations that natural law would require, as Aquinas
concluded, "it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general
and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to
proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. '255
These particular determinations, he continued, are called human
laws. 256 The foregoing four categories of law provide the necessary
framework for conceptualizing the existence, characteristics, and
operation of natural law, and for analyzing the domain in which legal
obligation operates.
B. Characteristicsof the Natural Law Framework
The importance of accurately assessing the attributes of natural
law cannot be underestimated, and an error in theory leads to
imprecise analysis.
The characteristics of natural law will be
discussed, including the classification of natural law as law, the
principles that natural law prescribes, the uniformity of natural law
over time compared with the variability of human law, the
applicability of natural law to all humans, the critical relationship
between natural law and human law for the promotion of human
happiness, and the process of determining natural law by right
reason.
Natural law may properly be considered law. 257 Blackstone,
Pufendorf, Locke, and Austin explored the elements of a "law," which

254.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 95 art. 1, at 1013.
255.
Id. Q. 91 art. 3, at 997.
256.
Id.
257.
Ultimately, natural law provides instructions that can be considered a
moral standard of right and wrong, a law, a right, and an obligation, because all are
derived from the same standard blueprint for humans. Natural law sometimes
dictates what may be done, sometimes what should be done, sometimes what must be
done, and sometimes what must not be done. E.g., PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. III,
ch. V, § I, at 259.
It now follows in course, that we enquire how such Obligationsas are not born
with Men, should by virtue of some Act of theirs be laid upon them, by which
means there arises, at the same time, in other Persons a Right which before
they wanted. For these two moral Qualities have such a mutual Relation and
Dependence, that whenever there is produced an Obligation in one Man, there
immediately springs up a correspondent Right in another; for 'tis impossible to
apprehend that I am bound to any Performance, unless there be some Person
in the World, who can either fairly require it, or at least fairly receive it of me.
Tho' the Remark will not hold vice versa, that where-ever there is a Right in
one, there must presently be an Obligationin another.

Id. Extended discussions of the fine distinctions between rights and laws, and between
positive duties and negative prohibitions, are beyond the scope of this Note.
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to

Pufendorf, natural law receives its force from "presuppositions that
God exists and rules all things by His providence, and that He has
enjoined the human race to observe as laws those dictates of reason
'259
Otherwise, he continued,
which He has Himself promulgated.
"though they might be observed for their utility, like the prescriptions
2 60
Locke
doctors give to regulate health, they would not be laws."
found
in
natural
law,"
that
"all
the
requisites
of
a
law
are
noted
including the decree of a superior will, the laying down of what is and
what is not to be done, and the binding of men, containing "in itself
261
The enforcement of
all that is requisite to create an obligation."
natural law occurs in at least three ways, all of which negatively
reinforce any divergence from natural law: (1) defiance of the human

blueprint frustrates the human purpose and causes certain evils in
263
and (3) the divine
itself,2 6 2 (2) the conscience burdens divergences,
264
Although natural
judgment seat provides ultimate enforcement.
law is not always promulgated by written word or decree like human
265
and Pufendorf
law, the knowledge of it runs even deeper,

258.
E.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *43 ("[A] law always supposes some
superior who is to make it."); PUFENDORF, infra note 259, § 10, at 36 ("Laws necessarily
imply a superior, and such a superior as actually has governance of another.");
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. VI, § IX, at 63 ("Obligationsare laid on human
Minds properly by a Superior, that is, by such an One as not only hath sufficient
Strength to denounce some Evil against us upon Non-compliance, but hath likewise
just Reason to require the retrenching of our Free-wills by his own Pleasure."); LOCKE,
supra note 231, ch. V, at 173 ("[Tjhere is no law without a law-maker, and law is to no
purpose without punishment."); AUSTIN, infra note 296, at 10, 29-30 (stating that
commands, which are laws "properly so called," proceed from superiors to oblige
inferiors).
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIs JUXTA LEGEM
259.
NATURALEM LIBRI Duo [ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL
LAW IN Two BOOKS] § 10, at 36 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans.,
Cambridge 1991) (1673) (all citations to De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem
Naturalem are from the indicated section of chapter III ("On Natural Law") in book I,
unless otherwise indicated, and page numbers correspond to this particular
translation). See also supra notes 225, 226 (discussing God).
260.
PUFENDORF, supra note 259, § 10, at 36.
261.
LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. I, at 111, 113. See also infra text accompanying
note 315 (quoting Hobbes).
E.g., infra text accompanying notes 286-87 (quoting Blackstone); infra text
262.
accompanying notes 317-21.
263.
Supra note 241 and accompanying text.
264.
Infra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
265.
People have an innate sense of right and wrong, and can sense when
natural law is or is not followed. C.S. Lewis wrote that when two people quarrel, they
say things like, "How'd you like it if anyone did the same to you?", or "Come on, you
promised." LEWIS, supra note 243, at 17. The speaker is appealing to "some kind of
standard of behaviour which he expects the other man to know about." Id. The other
person does not say "[t]o hell with your standard," but instead "tries to make out that
what he has been doing does not really go against the standard, or that if it does there
is some special excuse." Id. Quarrelling, Lewis concluded, is trying to show that the
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commented, "it is sufficient that the Will of the Legislator be any way
made known to the Subject, tho' it should only be by the internal
266
Suggestion of Natural Light.
Natural law has been around since creation and can be charted
through history. In the first century A.D., when asked by a Pharisee
what constitutes the greatest commandment of the Mosaic law, Jesus
replied, "'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all
your soul and with all your mind.' This is the first and greatest
commandment. And the second is like it: 'Love your neighbor as

other man is in the wrong, and "there would be no sense in trying to do that unless you
and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are." Id. at 18
("[T]here would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless
there was some agreement about the rules of football."). See also LOCKE, supra note
231, ch. I, at 115.
[A]lthough even the more rational of men do not absolutely agree among
themselves as to what the law of nature is and what its true and known
precepts are, it does not follow from this that there is no law of nature at all; on
the contrary it follows rather that there is such a law, when people contend
about it so fiercely. For just as in a commonwealth it is wrong to conclude that
there are no laws because various interpretations of laws are to be met with
among jurisprudents, so likewise in morality it is improperly inferred that
there is no law of nature, because in one place it is pronounced to be this, in
another something different. This fact rather establishes the existence of the
law more firmly, seeing that all the disputants maintain the same idea about
the law itself (for they all know that there is something evil and something
good by nature), and they differ only in their interpretations of it.
Id. Grotius and Euripides observed that nearly everybody has the sense of right and
wrong:
I speak not things hard to be understood,
But such as, founded on the rules of good
And just, are known alike to learn'd and rude.
GROTIUS, supra note 233,
39, at xxxiv (quoting Euripides). Locke observed that all
men acknowledge some principle of good and evil "since there is no nation so savage
and so far removed from any humane feelings that it does not have some notion of
virtue and vice, some consciousness of praise and blame." LOCKE, supra note 231, ch.
II, at 123. "Even those among mortals who are corrupted by vice recognize it and while
shunning it approve it." Id. ch. I, at 109. Seneca reflected:
Ask a common Rogue ... whether he had not rather obtain by honest Means,
what he now gets by Theft and Villany? He who makes it his Gain to assault
and pillage all he meets, would be more willing to find the Money by Chance,
than to take it by Violence. There is no one who would not be better pleas'd to
enjoy the Fruits of his Wickedness without the Practice of it.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. III, ch. I, § I, at 214 (quoting Seneca) (italics omitted).
Therefore, "anyone can understand [the law of nature] who is willing to apply diligent
study and to direct his mind to the knowledge of it." LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. VI, at
187. Equity would be useless as a judicial tool if right and wrong could not be
determined in specific situations, but that is not the case. See infra note 294
(discussing the use of equity).
266.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. VI, § IV, at 60.
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yourself.'
All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two
commandments." 26 7 According to Thomas Aquinas, writing in the
13th century A.D., the first and most important command of natural
law is that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided,"
upon which all other commands of natural law are based. 268 Thomas
Hobbes, in the 17th century A.D., delineated three laws of nature: (1)
to seek peace and to follow it (and if peace cannot be obtained to use
the advantages of war),269 (2) "to lay down [the initial] right to all
things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as
he would allow other men against himself," which derives directly
from the Biblical requirement to "[d]o to others as you would have
them do to you," 270 and (3) "that men perform their covenants made:
without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the
right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of
war."2 71 Elsewhere, Hobbes referred to moral laws, synonymous with

267.
Matthew 22:37-40. See also Mark 12:28-34.
268.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 94 art. 2, at 1009.
269.
HOBBES, supra note 242, at 87.
270.
Id.; see also Luke 6:31. As Hobbes pointed out, the concept originated in
the words of Jesus. HOBBES, supra note 242, at 87; see also Matthew 7:12 ("So in
everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law
and the Prophets."). By the initial "right to all things," Hobbes was referring to what
he termed the "right of nature," which is the liberty "each man hath, to use his own
power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his
own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason,
he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." HOBBES, supra note 242, at 86.
This description appears to be similar to the interest of "self-preservation" discussed by
Locke. Self-preservation, Locke explained, is not the fundamental law of nature:
For if the source and origin of all this law is the care and preservation of
oneself, virtue would seem to be not so much man's duty as his convenience,
nor will anything be good except what is useful to him; and the observance of
this law would be not so much our duty and obligation, to which we are bound
by nature, as a privilege and an advantage, to which we are led by expediency.
LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. VI, at 181. See also PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. III, ch.
V, § III (commenting on the proper understanding of the right to all things); id. bk. II,
ch. II, § III (refining Hobbes' position). In the text above, Hobbes was cognizant of
problems that would arise if the initial right of nature were a fundamental law of
nature, because he required that right to be laid down as part of his second law
requiring the doing to others of what you would have them do to you. See also infra
text accompanying note 321 (stating the rationale of doing to others as you would have
them do to you).
271.
HOBBES, supra note 242, at 95. As reflected in the quotation above, Hobbes
envisioned the state of nature to be a state of war, which assessment is limited in value
because it fails to take account of the fall of man. Hobbes described the state of war as
a known disposition that every man is inclined to battle with, invade and destroy one
another, and a state characterized by a perpetual fear and danger of violent death. Id.
at 84. Yet such dispositions, and even death itself, were not known to man before his
fall. Aquinas described the inception of a "law of sin" beginning with Adam and Eve in
the Garden of Eden, characterized by man turning his back on God and deviating from
the path of reason. See AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 6, at 1000. See also infra
note 345 (quoting from Blackstone's discussion of the fall of man in Genesis); Genesis 3
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natural laws, as "consisting in the moral virtues as justice, equity,
'272
and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace, and charity.
Locke wrote in the 17th century that when one's "own Preservation
comes not in competition," he ought, "as much as he can, to preserve
the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an
Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the
Preservation of the Life, Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of
another."273
Pufendorf, also in the 17th century, named the
fundamental natural law as, "every man ought to do as much as he
can to cultivate and preserve sociality," 274 noting elsewhere that "men
have been made by nature to cultivate social relations with one
another, and that no one at all ought to bring upon a second person
that which can furnish a cause for discord and war, '2 75 and:
It is but a poor thing not to have hurt another, or not to have robb'd
him of his just Esteem: This negative Kindness to a Man will barely

(recounting how Adam and Eve disobeyed God by eating from the tree in the middle of
the Garden of Eden); Genesis 3:22 (explaining the moment at which God made death a
part of the human condition along with the other curses imposed; without the fall of
man Adam and Eve would have lived forever); Genesis 4:1-12 (telling of the first
murder after the fall of man). Sin can be defined as that which contradicts God or his
purposes for creation, which directly relates to the discussion of natural law and the
springing up of obligation.
See supra notes 224-46 and accompanying text.
Subsequent to the fall, the apostle Paul observed "another law at work in the members
of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the
law of sin at work within my members." Romans 7:23, quoted in AQUINAS, supra note
214, Q. 91 art. 6, at 1000. The law of sin that wages war against the law of God and
right reason creates the appearance of war that Hobbes observed (as did the apostle
Paul, Aquinas, and others). See also infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text (listing
some common indications of such a war). However, the critical point for assessing the
natural state of man should not be subsequent to creation as when the law of sin arose,
but rather at the time of creation. At the time of creation, God fashioned man in his
own image, and "saw all that he had made, and it was very good." Genesis 1:26-27;
Genesis 1:31. Thus, by the definition of sin, man lacked sin at the time of his creation,
and the indications of a state of war could not have existed before the fall. See, e.g.,
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. II, ch. II, §§ VII-VIII (criticizing Hobbes, noting that the
first men lived in a state of pure friendship rather than hostility). At bottom, it would
be senseless to try to comply with a standard of peace if peace would defy the purpose
for which man was created, and it would not be good or profitable for man to conform to
purposes not his own. Hobbes correctly observed a state of war, but inaccurately
described it as the natural state of man.
272.
HOBBES, supra note 242, at 189.
273.

2 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 311 (Peter Laslett ed.,

Cambridge 1960) (1690).
274.
PUFENDORF, supra note 259, § 9, at 35.
275.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, bk. I, def. XII, § 15, at 86. Pufendorf also
wrote that "the intent and purpose of the law of nature shall not come to naught, and
this intent and purpose is that an upright and peaceful society be preserved among
men." Id. bk. I, def. XIII, § 6, at 151. Elsewhere, Pufendorf isolated the absolute duty
antecedent to human institutions, "[T]hat no Man hurt another; and that in case of any
hurt or damage done by him, he fail not to make Reparation." PUFENDORF, supra note
1, bk. III, ch. I, § I, at 213.
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hinder him from having any fair Reason to hate, but can give him little
Encouragement to love us. To knit Mens Minds more strongly together,
it is necessary to add to this Forbearance of mutual Evil, the real
Practice of mutual Good. The Debt which I owe upon account of my
being a sociable Creature I have not yet discharg'd, whilst I have not
estrang'd a Man's Affection from me by any mischievous or distastful
Deed; but I ought farther to promote his actual Profit and Benefit, that
I may shew it is a Pleasure to me to see others Partners of my Nature,
and Sharers with me in the Goods which we possess. The near Relation
which Men naturally bear to one another, is lost, unless it be cherish'd
276
and kept up by a constant Commerce of kind Offices betwixt them.

Grotius also wrote in the 17th century and summarized natural law
as including the "rule of abstaining from that which belongs to other
persons" and "the fulfilling of promises. ' 2 77 Grotius encapsulated
natural law as the "Mother of Right."278 In the 18th century, William
Blackstone emphasized the principles "that we should live honestly,
should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due," to which
' 279
three principles Justinian "has reduced the whole doctrine of law.
Blackstone described the general principle propelling the law of

nations, "that different nations ought in time of peace to do one
another all the good they can; and, in time of war, as little harm as
possible, without prejudice to their own real interests." 28 0 Three
concepts of natural law are explicit within the Preamble to the U.S.
Constitution, written in the 18th century by the Founding Fathers of
the United States, including justice, peace, and liberty. 28 1 Justice
and peace are similar to the primary natural law principles of seeking
the common good, avoiding harm to others, and rendering to each his
own, as Jerome Frank highlighted in the 20th century. 282 The
foregoing principles of natural law are indisputably broad in nature,
but they have been the pillars of law throughout time up until the
present day.
Principles of natural law remain consistent over time, and the
natural law that applied to sovereigns years ago still applies in
today's international legal order.
Eternal law, divine law, and
natural law do not contradict and are very much in line with each

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. III, ch. III, § I, at 233.
GROTIUS, supra note 233, T 8, at xxv.
Id. 16, at xxvii.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *40.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *66.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.

Id.
282.

FRANK, supra note 216, at xx (referring to Aquinas).
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other by necessity. Pufendorf explained: "[S]ince God is quite as
much the author of natural laws as of his own positive laws, and it
were impious to think that he ordains things contradictory to one
another, it is assuredly apparent that the divine positive laws cannot
at all be opposed to natural laws. ' 2 8 3 Moreover, Grotius explained
that the "will of God ... is never at variance with the true Law of
Nature." 284 Not only are eternal law, divine law, and natural law
internally consistent, but they are consistent over time as well. The
fact that nature's Creator does not change lends support to the notion
that he does not need to alter the laws of nature to maintain
consistency. 285 Furthermore, according to Blackstone, the rules of
action imposed by the Creator at the beginning of time upon motion,
gravitation, optics, mechanics, nature, and nations can never be
departed from or that matter would cease to be as created. 286 He
explained that
When a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism, he
establishes at his own pleasure certain arbitrary laws for its direction;
as that the hand shall describe a given space in a given time; to which
law as long as the work conforms, so long it continues in perfection, and
2 87
answers the end of its formation.

Thus, as Blackstone observed, a thing must continue to follow the
laws of its creation, and the world was only created once.
It is the broad character of natural law principles that enables
natural law to be perpetually binding yet never changing, and the
concept becomes more lucid when making an analogy to the U.S.
Constitution. There exists a continuing "interpretive mission" 28 8 in
trying to ascertain the proper application of the Constitution to the
facts of particular situations, which prompted Justice Stevens of the
Supreme Court to comment that "[t]he Constitution of the United
States is a mysterious document. '289 The Fourteenth Amendment,
for example, prohibits states from infringing on the privileges or
immunities of citizens, "but contains no catalogue of privileges or

283.

PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 6, at 150.

284.

GROTIUS, supra note 233,

48, at xxxvi.

285.
See, e.g., Psalm 100:5 ("For the Lord is good and his love endures forever;
his faithfulness continues through all generations."); Psalm 102:25-27 ("In the
beginning you laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your
hands. They will perish, but you remain... you remain the same, and your years will
never end."), quoted in Hebrews 1:11-12; Mark 13:31 ('Heaven and earth will pass
away,' said Jesus, 'but my words will never pass away."'); Hebrews 13:8 (characterizing
God as the same "yesterday and today and forever"). See also supra text accompanying
note 221 (citing Aquinas and Augustine on the unchangeable nature of God).
286.
Supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
287.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *38.
288.

64 (1991).
289.

LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION

Id. at 1 (quoting John Paul Stevens).
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immunities. ' 290 Many of the Framers of the Constitution "supposed
that the meaning, at least of the more general terms being deployed,
was inherently variable .. .[and] that the examples likely to occur to
them at the time of the creation would not be forever fixed into the
meaning of the text itself. ' 291 The Framers did not intend to fashion
a temporary document for their own time, but rather to create a
document that could apply to posterity, 292 and the document contains
"very little in the way of specific political solutions. '2 93 Instead, one
author observed that the Constitution is an expression of certain
general principles that reflect "the deepest purpose of the
Thus, except for such things as specifically
Constitution. ' 294

290.
Id. at 6-7. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
291.
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 288, at 9-10.
292.
Edwin Meese, III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 14 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
293.
Id. at 16. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the "Constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory").
294.
Meese, supra note 292, at 16. Perhaps the deepest purpose of antitrust law
can partially explain a criticism by one author of the handling of antitrust cases by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Presumably, since the United States was the first country along
with the United Kingdom to enact antitrust legislation in 1890, it should have the most
practice if it were going to establish rigid rules. See supra note 142. However,
Professor Ross commented, "In cases involving horizontal restraints, the Court
frequently
makes
contradictory
statements,
overrules
precedent without
acknowledging that it is doing so, and describes its mode of analysis in a way that
appears to be at variance with what it is really doing." ROSS, supra note 43, at 118.
Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court was attempting to follow the general principles
behind antitrust and apply the statute fairly to the facts at hand. Equity, not defined
restrictively, is indivisible from the process of making law or deciding cases.
Judge Posner characterized the discussion thus implicated in United States v.
Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990), where he contrasted the "severely
positivistic view that the content of law is exhausted in clear, explicit, and definite
enactments by or under express delegation from legislatures," with the natural
lawyer's view that "the practice of interpretation and the general terms of the
Constitution (such as 'equal protection of the laws') authorize judges to enrich positive
law with the moral values and practical concerns of civilized society." Posner noted the
drawback of the positivist slant, which "buys political neutrality and a type of
objectivity at the price of substantive injustice," and the drawback of the natural law
slant, which "buys justice in the individual case at the price of considerable uncertainty
and, not infrequently, judicial willfulness." Id. Posner commented: "It is no wonder
that our legal system oscillates between the approaches." Id.
Equity is defined as "fairness; impartiality; evenhanded dealing," or alternatively
"[t]he body of principles constituting what is fair and right; natural law." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999) (noting the influence of natural law, or equity, on the
Declaration of Independence); see also notes 327, 281 and accompanying text
(regarding the birth of the United States from natural law principles). Grotius
provided another definition of equity as "the correction of that, wherein the law (by
reason of its universality) is deficient." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *61 (quoting
Grotius). See also id. at *62 ("[T]here can be no established rules and fixed precepts of
equity laid down, without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to a positive
law."). Pufendorf explained a typical situation calling for application of equity,
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enumerated eligibility requirements for the president, for example,
the Constitution is characterized by a high level of abstraction, and it
avoids rigidly defined rules. Consequently, the government has been
able to sustain its influence as a valid and respected institution for
over 200 years, despite monumental changes associated with
industrialization, globalization, the economy, technology, and even a
civil war-without having to reinvent the Constitution at every turn.
By necessity, then, a body of law applicable to the entire human race
for all time, that must account for countless fact scenarios, cultures,
and the customs of every nation, must operate at a high level of

For it happens frequently that an absurdity follows from applying to special
cases the letter of the law, because the legislators have not been able to see and
make exception for these special cases, owing to the variety and number of
them. But, since no one is presumed to have established absurdities by a law,
it is thoroughly understood that the legislator had not intended to include such
cases, and so, the judge who restricts through equity the universality of the
letter, is not setting himself in opposition to the legislator, but rather is
prudently gathering his intent by inference from the analogy and sense of other
laws.
PUFENDORF, supranote 226, § 22, at 164.
A balanced natural law approach is more fitting than a positivistic approach when
human law cannot be specifically defined to fit every situation ex ante, which is always,
and uncertainty can be diminished at least as far as the facts known before trial
permit. Unlike human law, natural law is designed to fit every situation before it
happens, so it is always useful to a court. Because the judge applying equity gathers
the intent of the legislature (unless the legislature has contradicted natural law),
uncertainty could be diminished or eliminated by researching the intent of the
legislature if a statute is at issue. If a statute is not at issue, Blackstone's scheme of
applying equity entails following precedent first, and only applying equity when it
conflicts with right reason and natural law, which maintains immediate certainty of
outcome in most cases. Infra text accompanying note 300. In the cases requiring
equity (e.g., Judge Cardozo's opinion in Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 888
(N.Y. 1930): "Let the hardship be strong enough, and equity will find a way, though
many a formula of inaction may seem to bar the path."), one might still predict an
outcome with some degree of certainty by analyzing the equities, which requires a
refined sense of morality rather than only an aptitude for synthesizing precedents, and
an objective perspective rather than the mental positioning that results from being a
hired advocate for a particular client. E.g., infra note 342 (quoting Hebrews 5:14).
Such certainty could be had even if equity were used more frequently than Blackstone
suggested. However, the problem with too much equity is that a judge becomes too
much like a legislator, which in turn begins to offend the purposes of separation of
powers. See infra note 351 and accompanying text; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
215, at *62 ("And law, without equity, tho' hard and disagreeable, is much more
desirable for the common good, than equity without law: which would make every
judge a legislator."). The ultimate purpose of separating powers is to ensure equity at
the systemic level by limiting power imbalances that ultimately compromise fairness.
In view of the big picture, limited judicial use of equity actually permits the greatest
distribution of equity. Thus, Blackstone's view of the role of equity not only promotes
the most equitable system of government and substantive justice in each case, but
uncertainty need not be greater than the facts require. E.g., infra note 310 (citing
Frank regarding the potential for factual error).
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abstraction a fortiori. Natural law principles describe the "deepest
purposes" of human beings according to the human blueprint, just as
the Constitution describes the "deepest purposes" of our government.
General principles employed to determine right and wrong are not
impaired by changing fact scenarios, cultural variances, or
technological innovations because all human activity can be
encompassed within the ambit of natural law.
Although natural law does not change, human law changes
according to the needs of society in two ways. Aquinas delineated two
just causes for change in human law, where the law may change (1)
due to a change "on the part of reason," or (2) contemporaneous with
295
a change "on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law."
First, a change on the part of reason may be necessary because,
although a conflict between eternal law, divine law, and natural law
is impossible, a conflict between human law and natural law is a
more apparent danger. As Austin noted, human law is the creature
of imperfect human sovereigns, and not of the Divine monarch. 296 As
a result, Aquinas related that
it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the
[Flor those who first endeavored to
imperfect to the perfect ....
discover something useful for the human community, not being able by
themselves to take everything into consideration, set up certain
institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were
changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might
297
prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.

Progressing from the imperfect to the perfect might involve rectifying
old mistakes, because a human law that "deflects from the law of
nature" is a "perversion of law"'298 and is considered unjust to the
degree it contradicts natural law. 299 Blackstone explained that
common law judges are bound by precedent, having a sworn duty not
to pronounce new law unless a former decision is "most evidently
contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine
law." 300 Anything that is not reason is not law, he continued, and a
"manifestly absurd or unjust" decision is not considered "bad law,"
but "not law"-that is, "that it is not the established custom of the

AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 97 art. 1, at 1022.
295.
296.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 10-11, 141,
142 (Wilfrid E. Rumble, ed., 1995).
297.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 97 art. 1, at 1022.
298.
Id. Q. 95 art. 2, at 1014.
299.
See id. Q. 96 art. 4, at 1019-20 (explaining that "laws may be unjust
through being opposed to the divine good"); see also id. Q. 95 art. 2, at 1014
(mentioning that "the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice"); DEGAN, supra
note 250, at 24 (discussing the same concept by quoting Aquinas).
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *69.
300.
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realm, as has been erroneously determined.130 ' Thus, a judge might
diverge from precedent to rectify the law, where he does not "pretend
to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from
misrepresentation." 30 2 In fact, Blackstone explained, law is the
"perfection of reason, that it always intends to conform thereto,13 03
which implies a continuing process of checking positive law against
natural law, the larger standard to which human law should conform
in all cases.
The second way human law changes is "on account of the
changed condition of man, to whom different things are expedient
according to the difference of his condition." 30 4 Natural law, Grotius
wrote, "deals not only with things made by nature herself, but with
things produced by the act of man." 30 5 For example, "property, as it
now exists, is the result of human will: but being once introduced,
Natural Law itself shews that it is unlawful for me to take what is
yours against your will. 30° 6 Thus, as Grotius astutely observed, there
is a "seeming of change" in acts directed by natural law, but "in fact it
is not Natural Law which is changed, but the thing about which that
Law is concerned. ' 30 7 The application of natural law in the form of
new human laws enacted for evolving circumstances should not be

301.
Id. at *70, *71. See also AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 96 art. 4, at 1020
(quoting Augustine, "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all" (italics omitted)).
Austin criticized Blackstone's position, stating that "to say that human laws which
conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark
nonsense." AUSTIN, supra note 296, at 157-58. Blackstone would not have denied that
some hypothetical unjust human law could result in an unjust temporal outcome for a
particular citizen, because he realized that vindicating misrepresentations in the law
might mean that cases prior to such vindication had been adjudged according to the
error of law. See infra text accompanying note 302; see also GROTIUS, supra note 233,
27, at xxx ("Nor ought any persons to be moved by the occasional success of unjust
designs."); FRANK, infra note 310. Blackstone certainly meant that unjust human laws
were not binding, but he did not mean that they could not result in undue punishment.
See also infra notes 322-24 and accompanying text. In one sense, human law is
typically promulgated by superiors to oblige inferiors according to the definition of
"law," but a superior forfeits his authority by promulgating an unjust human law. See
supra note 258; see also infra notes 322, 378. In another sense, human law is only a
particular contextual application of natural law, meaning that human law is not really
law when it conflicts with divine law or natural law even though it can cause damage
to particular citizens. See supra text accompanying notes 253, 255-56. Dworkin
encapsulated Austin's criticism by noting that "all specimens captured-even
Blackstone and Joseph Beale-have had to be released after careful reading of their
texts." DWORKIN, infra note 380, at 16. An extended discussion of semantic detail is
beyond the scope of this Note.
302.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *70.
303.
Id.
304.

Id.

GROTIUS, supra note 233, bk. I, ch. I, § X, 4, at 4.
305.
306.
Id.
6, at 5. See also id. 30, at xxxi (explaining natural
307.
Id. bk. I, ch. I, § X,
law as "being always the same").
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confused as natural law itself, although natural law still guides
30 8
conduct under new situations.
Some writers have not separated natural law from human law
explicitly enough, creating a confused picture of natural law as
changing over time. Vitoria, or James Brown Scott in his analysis of
Vitoria, misapprehended natural law as having a "changing and
variable content, which may be said to be artificial, in that it takes
note of man's civilization, '30 9 confusing the variation of civil laws
with the invariable natural law principles behind them. Jerome
Frank made the distinction between natural law and positive law, but
perhaps not explicitly enough, writing that the Thomists "freely
acknowledge that the applications of those highly general
principles-applications which necessarily take the form of manmade rules-must vary with time, place, and circumstance. 3 10
Frank's statement appears to conflate natural law and positive law.
Only when natural law (highly general principles) is applied in the
form of particular human law (man-made rules) does it vary with
time, place, and circumstance.
Not only does natural law remain constant over time in
contradistinction to human law, but it is applicable to all human
beings that have the same human blueprint from creation. According
to Grotius, Aquinas, and Isidore, natural law is common to all
nations, 3 11 and Blackstone wrote that natural law is "binding over all
the globe, in all countries, and at all times. '312 Natural law's
universal applicability to humans implies its relevance to human
establishments as well. Natural law pronounces certain rights and
duties inherent in humanity, which are prescribed for nations in the

308.
See also infra note 349 (discussing the error of conceiving of natural law as
an application or investigation of natural law).
309.
JAMES BROWN Sco'T, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS 165 (1934).
310.
FRANK, supra note 216, at xx. Frank referred to himself as a "fact skeptic,"
noting that judicial decision turns on a "multitude of elusive factors," including the
"humanly fallible" process of discerning whether witnesses are telling the truth and
unconscious prejudices of judges and juries who are "also human." Id. at xii. As a
result, Frank mentioned that natural law "furnishes no helpful standard for evaluating
the fact-determinations of trial courts in most lawsuits, and no assistance in ensuring
uniformity, certainty, or predictability in such determinations." Id. at xx. Indeed,
natural law is not the same as reason or discernment, which are tools used by humans
to reach a conclusion consistent with natural law, subject to human imperfections.
E.g., infra note 349; infra text accompanying notes 341-45. As Frank noted, if a court
were to decide that a particular man Wilcox has broken a contract, but he has not, that
decision "is surely unjust if in truth he did not so act." FRANK, supra note 216, at xx.
The frequency of judicial error in determining the best result according to natural law
is beyond the scope of this Note.
311.
GROTIUS, supra note 233, bk. I, ch. I, § X1V, T 1, at 6; AQUINAS, supra note
214, Q. 94 art. 4, at 1011 (quoting Isidore).
312.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *41.
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same manner as they are prescribed for individuals, according to
Pufendorf. 313 Hobbes reflected:
Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are
comprehended in that law, which is commonly called the law of nations,
I need not say any thing in this place; because the law of nations, and
the law of nature, is the same thing. 3 1 4 And every sovereign hath the
same right, in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular
man can have, in procuring his own safety. And the same law, that
dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to do,
and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to
commonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and
sovereign assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but in the
conscience only; where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws, (such of
them as oblige all mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the author of
nature, are natural; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of
3 15
kings, are laws.

Similarly, Pufendorf found "no reason for our conducting any special
discussion [on the Law of Nations] here, since what we recount on the
subject of the law of nature and of the duties of individuals, can be
readily applied to whole states and nations which have also coalesced
into one moral person. '3 16 Natural law is applicable to and binding
over all humans and all countries.
Natural law's intrinsic presence in humans translates into the
import of obeying it, and human conformity with natural law
translates into human happiness. Pufendorf commented that "[to]
observe Nature's Laws is good and profitable to Mankind," 3 17 and
that "by a natural Consequence our Happiness flows from such

313.
See PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 24, at 165.
314.
But see GROTIUS, supra note 233,
40, at xxxiv (noting that "writers
everywhere confound the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations"). Grotius correctly
distinguished the law of nations from the law of nature just as he distinguished civil
law from the law of nature, where both the law of nations and civil law are contextual
applications of natural law by humans, subject to the same potential defects and
limitations as is discussed below. See, e.g., id. 38, at xxxiii. See also AQUINAS, supra
note 214, Q. 95 art. 4, at 1016 (dividing positive law into the law of nations and civil
law). A fair reading of the entire quotation above evinces that Hobbes would agree
with the more accurate statement of Pufendorf. See infra text accompanying note 316.
His point was that natural law applies and obliges both domestically and
internationally.
315.
HOBBES, supra note 242, at 235.
316.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 24, at 165. See also VERZIJL, infra note 340,
at 3.
[Tihere is no denying that international law has always been historically
intertwined with the concept of a natural law; that, in fact, the former has been
treated by many authors as a simple deduction from, or application of, the law
of nature; and that only a very few writers totally reject the central idea itself
which underlies it.
Id.
317.

PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. VI, § IV, at 60.
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Actions as are agreeable to the Law of Nature, and our Misery from
such as are repugnant to it. '3 18 Conversely, as Pufendorf explained
elsewhere, "by breaking the Law of Nature they exceedingly obstruct
their own Happiness (the Promotion of which depends on the
Assistance of others) and bring many grievous Evils and Dangers on
themselves. ' 3 19 Grotius keenly observed:
For as a citizen who violates the Civil Law for the sake of present
utility, destroys that institution in which the perpetual utility of
himself and his posterity is bound up; so too a people which violates the
Laws of Nature and Nations, beats down the bulwark of its own
tranquillity for future time. And even if no utility were to arise from
the observation of Law, it would be a point, not of folly, but of wisdom,
32 0
to which we feel ourselves drawn by nature.

Pufendorf echoed Grotius' rationale for following the dictates of
natural law, because
even if, perchance, sometimes they inconvenience some one person, on
another occasion again they may help him; and that the equality of
right which laws of that kind set up among citizens removes the cause
of complaints. For there are some things which, although, perchance,
we might be eager to be permitted to do ourselves, nevertheless, if
others also were going to be permitted to do them to us, we should not
desire to be permitted to do ourselves; and if such things be established
by civil laws, it is impossible that peace and the proper order intended
321
by nature be not disturbed.

The diligence of humans in regarding the precepts of natural law
directly effects their happiness and the success of their communities.
The beneficial harmony between human efforts and natural law
should also be sought in the context of creating human law, to
promote the efficacy of human law. If human law does not conform to
natural law, the lawgiver has exceeded his authority according to
Aquinas. 322 Where a state compels citizens either to do something
forbidden by natural law or to give up doing something natural law
orders, Pufendorf explained, "we emphatically deny that obedience is

318.
Id. bk. II, ch. III, § XX, at 144.
319.
Id. bk. VII, ch. I, § XI, at 633.
320.
GROTIUS, supra note 233,
18, at xxviii ("For since, by his own confession,
that Citizen is not foolish who in a Civil Community obeys the Civil Law, although, in
consequence of such respect for the Law he may lose something which is useful to
himself."). See also id.
22, at xxix ("[There is no State so strong that it may not, at
some time, need the aid of others external to itself.").
321.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 6, at 151.
322.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 96 art. 4, at 1019-20 (noting that laws are just
"when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver," which occurs
when a law is "contrary to the commandments of God" or when a law "inflicts unjust
hurt on its subjects"). The authority of a lawgiver is a delegation of authority from
God, as Locke pointed out in Essays On the Laws of Nature, which means that an
action contrary to God's law is an abuse of that authority. See infra note 378.
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due the state."3 23 Such disobedience is justified because "the [social]
pact, whereby a man obligates himself to obey the supreme command,
is not so absolute but it involves at least the limitation, 'as far as
what is ordered be not opposed to the laws of God and nature.' 3 24
Citizens become aware of discrepancies between their government's
actions and natural law. Justice, or "the observance of Rights" as
Grotius defined it, "brings security to the conscience; while injustice
inflicts on it tortures and wounds. '325 And "[t]he conscience of honest
men approves justice, condemns injustice. 3 26 Citizens continually
make critical determinations of whether the government comports
with or offends their deep sense of what is right and fair, natural law
being the standard against which the government is judged.
Accordingly, the Declaration
of Independence
stated that
governments "derive[] their just powers from the consent of the
governed," and a "history of repeated injuries and usurpations" by the
King of Great Britain prompted the 13 colonies to declare their
independence. 327 As citizens tolerate only limited divergence from
natural law, a government that promulgates laws conflicting with
natural law is likely to fail in the long run, or at least whenever it can
no longer use coercive force, depending on the gravity and frequency
of the contradictions. Good governance requires that lawmakers
honor natural law principles.
The efforts of some people to separate the moral precepts of
natural law from human law is not only patently unwise, but it is
virtually inconceivable how that might be done. At an address in
1897, Oliver Wendall Holmes commented, "I often doubt whether it
would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be
banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which
328
should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law."

323.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 7, at 153.
324.
Id. See also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *42-43 (explaining that if a
human law "should allow or injoin us to commit [murder] ... we are bound to
transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine").
325.
GROTIUS, supra note 233, 20, at xxviii.
326.
Id. See also id.
27, at xxx ("How great the power of the conscience of
justice is, the writers of histories everywhere shew, often ascribing victory to this cause
mainly."); supra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing the conscience).
327.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration
of Independence discussed the role of government to secure the unalienable rights of
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness endowed by the Creator. Id. The rights cited
are natural rights, not rights conferred by a government. When government "becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute a new government." Id. See also infra note 349 para. 2 (noting that consent
does not actually create natural law but might point to it; and that the non-consent of
the governed does not automatically imply injustice or that the government is
offending natural law).
328.
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 45, 50
(Conrad Johnson ed., 1993).
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But while attempting to "dispel a confusion between morality and
law" and asking his audience to "imagine yourselves indifferent to
other and greater things," Holmes admitted that "law, if not a part of
morality, is limited by it," that law "is the witness and external
deposit of our moral life," and that the history of law is the history of
moral development. 329 So while Holmes promoted mastering law's
"specific marks," 330 he advised his audience not to study that which
defines law and gives it boundaries. 331 Moreover, John Austin
attempted to separate human law from the law that "ought" to be.332
According to the introduction to Austin's work, if the distinction
between what law is and what law ought to be "has a core meaning, it
is a denial of any necessary connection between the law that is and
the law that ought to be. ' 3 3 3
Yet while denying a necessary
connection between human law and morality, Austin conceded to the
"frequent coincidence" of law and morality, referred to instances
where "positive law has been fashioned on positive morality, or where
positive law has been fashioned on the law of God," and where a
portion of positive law "is parcel of the law of nature.''334 Austin
observed that positive laws are closely analogous and related to laws
of God and positive morality, "[i]n the way of resemblance," and even
admitted "without hesitation" that "all human laws ought to conform
to the Divine laws," and that "human lawgivers are themselves
obliged by the Divine laws to fashion the laws which they impose by
that ultimate standard, because if they do not, God will punish
them. '335 The question lingers whether positive laws that bear close
resemblance to the laws of God and positive moral rules, and that
ought to conform to them, can actually be distinguished from them in
the "no necessary connection" sense that Austin seemed to
advance. 336 Even discussions of the possibility of divorcing human
law from natural law and moral principles cannot maintain
consistency.

329.
Id. at 46-47.
330.
Id. at 47.
331.
Not only did Holmes fail to provide a convincing reason to ignore morality
in the study of law, but he also failed to separate natural law from his own opinions.
Justice Souter pinpointed Holmes as having written the opinion that came closer to
natural law on the matter of sovereign immunity than any other Supreme Court
opinion in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907). Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 795 (1999).
332.
AUSTIN, supra note 296, at 157-58.
333.
Wilfrid E. Rumble, Introduction to AUSTIN, supranote 296, at xviii.
334.
AUSTIN, supra note 296, at 141, 142.
335.
Id. at 11, 157-58.
336.
If Austin meant only that human law can act autonomously from natural
law and has the ability to do something different than what natural law prescribes,
such a thesis could have been explored without the semantic cartwheels by reading
Blackstone, Grotius, Pufendorf, Aquinas, and Locke. See, e.g., supra note 301; see also
supra paragraph accompanying notes 234-46 (discussing the free will of humans).
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A prudent lawmaker will attempt to ensure harmony between
human law and natural law by the use of reason. The U.S. Supreme
Court recently referred to natural law as "a universally applicable
proposition discoverable by reason. ' 337 Rational creatures, wrote
Aquinas, are subject to divine providence in a more "excellent way"
than animals or plants, and have a "share of the Eternal Reason,
whereby [they have] a natural inclination to [their] proper act[s] and
end[s]: and this participation of the eternal law in [] rational
creature[s] is called the natural law. '338 Blackstone explained that
God "laid down certain immutable laws of human nature.., and gave
him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws,"
and to "make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his
behaviour. '3 39 Natural law, according to Emeritus Professor of
International Law at Utrecht University, Dr. J.H.W. Verzijl, is "of
such a nature that [it] can be conceived, and should in virtue of [its]
'340
intrinsic cogency be adopted, as enforceable commands.
Still, not everybody demonstrates understanding of the direction
natural law prescribes at all times, although all humans have the
ability to use reason. Locke explained that some people "make no use
of the light of reason but prefer darkness and would not wish to show
themselves to themselves," and others are "brought up in vice, who
scarcely distinguish between good and evil. '34 1 Locke recommended
consulting those "who are more rational and perceptive than the
rest"342 for discerning the laws of nature, but even the virtuous few
may be "led astray by the violence of passions or being indifferent

337.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 763 (1999).
338.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 2, at 997. See also supra notes 236-39
and accompanying discussions (noting the superiority of mankind to other beings,
endowed with reason and free will and therefore obligation).
339.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *39-40.
340.
1 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3
(1968) (summarizing Langemeijer's analysis of natural law in the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Sciences). See also supra note 265 (discussing the conceivability of natural
law).
341.
LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. I, at 115. To this Locke added:
[I]t does not follow that a law does not exist or is not published, because it is
impossible for a blind man, and difficult for one who sees badly, to read a legal
notice displayed in a public place, so, in other circumstances, a man who is
occupied is not free, nor an idle or bad man disposed, to lift his eyes to the
notice board and learn from it the nature of his duty.
Id. at 113, 115. Locke also wrote that the knowledge of natural law "can be concealed
from no one unless he loves blindness and darkness and casts off nature in order that
he may avoid his duty." Id. ch. VI, at 189.
342.
Id. ch. I, at 115. See also Hebrews 5:14 ("But solid food is for the mature,
who by constant use have trained themselves to distinguish good from evil.").
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through carelessness or degenerate through habit. '3 43 Pufendorf
reflected, "Those Motions of the Mind which they call Passions or
Affections, chiefly excited by the Appearances of Good and Evil, have
likewise a great Force in driving the Will violently to some certain
Actions, besides their ill Influence on the Judgment, which they
frequently cloud and obscure. '3 4 4 Blackstone wrote that the discovery
of universal propositions would be easy if reason were "clear and
perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, [and]
unimpaired by disease or intemperance," but human experience "now
3' 45
finds the contrary.
Due to the various human proclivities that tend to lead reason
astray, not just any reasoning will suffice, but right reason is law, as
Cicero wrote.3 46 Cicero explained that the type of reason that man
and God have in common is "the highest reason, rooted in nature,
which commands things that must be done and prohibits the
opposite," and that type of right reason is, in turn, law. 347 Locke
defined reason, not as "that faculty of the understanding which forms
trains of thought and deduces proofs," but as "certain definite
principles of action from which spring all virtues and whatever is
necessary for the proper moulding of morals."3 48 Only that which is
''correctly derived from these principles is justly said to be in
accordance with right reason."3 49 A judgment "rightly framed" is

LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. I, at 115. Following the "inducements of
343.
pleasure or the urges of their base instincts rather than the dictates of reason" may
also lead to errant conclusions. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 195
(discussing James Madison's description of men as non-angels).
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. IV, § VII, at 39.
344.
345.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *41. Blackstone wrote that human
experience now finds the contrary in an allusion to Adam in Genesis, "our first ancestor
before his transgression," but "every man now finds.., that his reason is corrupt, and
his understanding full of ignorance and error." Id.; Genesis 1:26-3:24 (accounting for
the creation of man through the fall of man).
1 CICERO, supra note 236, at 113. See also GROTIUS, supra note 233, bk. I,
346.
ch. I, § X, 1, at 4 (explaining that natural law is the dictate of right reason).
347.

1 CICERO, supra note 236, at 111.

LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. I, at 111.
348.
349.
Id. Implied in Locke's statement is that reason is not the maker of natural
law, "unless, violating the dignity of the supreme legislator, we wish to make reason
responsible for that received law which it merely investigates." Id. Reason does not
establish natural law, but searches for it and discovers it. Id. Aquinas suggested two
ways to derive enforceable commands from natural law, "first, as a conclusion from
premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities." AQUINAS, supra
note 214, Q. 95 art. 2, at 1014. He further explained that the first way is like "to that
by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while
the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are
particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of
a house to some particular shape." Id. For an example of the first way, "that one must
not kill may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to
no man." Id. at 1015. Grotius suggested methods of determining natural law a priori
and a posteriori, "the former the more subtle, the latter, the more popular proof."
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required, as Grotius explained, which is "not to be misled by fear or
by the temptation of present pleasure, nor to be carried away by blind
and thoughtless impulse. '3 50 To enable judgments rightly framed,
the Founding Fathers separated legislative, executive, and judicial
powers in the U.S. Constitution to minimize the impact of the human

GROTIUS, supra note 233, bk. I, ch. I, § XII,
1, at 5. An a priori proof demonstrates
natural law by "shewing the agreement or disagreement of anything with the rational
and social nature of man," while an a posteriori proof considers such things as
acceptance by civilized nations. Id.
But acceptance by civilized nations, or consent generally, does not create natural
law, either. E.g., PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 2, at 147-48.
Nor, in truth, are those sufficiently accurate who speak of laws as certain
common agreements ... since thereby they confuse a law with a pact. For
assuredly, neither the positive divine laws nor the laws of nature can be said to
have arisen from the agreement or consent of men.
Id. Even "if there existed among men a unanimous and universal consent concerning
some opinion, that consent would not prove this opinion to be a natural law." LOCKE,
supra note 231, ch. V, at 177. As Locke cautioned, "if what is rightful and lawful were
to be determined by men's way of living, moral rectitude and integrity would be done
for. What immorality would not be allowable and even be inevitable, if the example of
the majority gave us the law?" Id. at 165. As Pufendorf observed, the consent of all
nations cannot be conclusory because
the Number of Fools far exceeds that of wise Men; and [ ] few Persons have
form'd their Opinions upon a full Search into the Foundations of Things; but
most Men follow on in the Track of others, and yield an implicit Assent to their
Notions, without applying their own Thoughts or Judgments to the Points in
Debate.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. II, ch. III, § VII, at 125. As a result, Locke imagined
that unanimous consent "might point to natural law," or "might make me believe more
ardently ...that this opinion is a law of nature," but it could not prove it. LOCKE,
supra note 231, ch. V, at 177. Consent operates similarly to reason, which investigates
the content of natural law, but like reason, it might conclude erroneously as to the
direction dictated by natural law, and it does not necessarily follow from consent that
the matter is consistent with natural law. See supra notes 341-45 and accompanying
text.
Grotius reviewed that Hesiod, Heraclitus, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and
Quintilian agreed that "the consent of all nations is evidence of the truth." GROTIUS,
supra note 233, bk. I, ch. I, § XII,
1, at 5 (emphasis added). See also id. 40, at xxxiv
("I have made use of the testimonies of philosophers, historians, poets, and finally
orators ... as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, proceeding from innumerable
different times and places, must be referred to some universal cause.").
But
widespread consent should still not be taken as automatic proof of natural law, and the
same precautions should be taken with any contextual observation of the utilization of
natural law, including the use of equity in courts (supra notes 294, 310), the
promulgation of human law modeled after but not always equivalent to natural law
(supra discussion accompanying notes 295-310), the giving of consent (including
consent to the dictates of government, supra note 327), and the formation of pacts
(supra note 213
1). The general idea is that natural law principles are constantly
being employed, but accuracy of application by humans is not guaranteed and the
product is not necessarily equivalent to natural law. See, e.g., supra note 265.
350. GROTIUS, supranote 233, 9, at xxv.

302

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.243

351
propensity to succumb to improper influences upon right reason.
Where human laws are just, products of right reason, and consistent
with natural law, they have "the power of binding in conscience, from
the eternal law whence they are derived. ''3 52 Upon the premise of an
accurate description of the attributes of natural law, an analysis of a
specific legal question demands criteria for determining when to
enforce natural law.

C. Policy of Natural Law Enforcement
Feasibility concerns limit the ability of human law to enforce
natural law. Seneca wrote, "How slight a thing it is to be a good man
according to the law! How much more broadly does the rule of duties
extend than the rule of law! How many things do piety, humanity,
justice, fidelity demand!
And yet they are all outside public
records." 353 Because of the more extensive list of duties under
natural law, Pufendorf did "not dare to affirm" that a civil magistracy
is "bound to punish all wrongs whatsoever that have been committed
against the law of nature. ' 354 All evil deeds, wrote Aquinas, cannot
be punished or forbidden by human law, because, "while aiming at
doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things,
and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is
necessary for human intercourse. 3 55 Additionally, complications
arise where natural law violations involve "[i]nner acts of the mind,"
and Pufendorf pointed out the administrative infeasibility of such
enforcement because, "forsooth, it is beyond the power of other men to
know whether obedience has been rendered the laws or not, so long as
356
external acts do not reveal it."1
Pufendorf imagined the
administrative infeasibility of a "boundless harvest of suits before
tribunals" if all natural law were enforced civilly.3 57 Therefore,
human law might effectively give permission to do something that
natural law prohibits.

351.
text.
352.
353.
354.

See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; see also supra notes 191, 192 and accompanying

355.

AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 4, at 998. For example, dishonesty in

AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 96 art. 4, at 1019.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 18, at 161 (quoting Seneca).
Id. § 7, at 152.

contracting is prohibited only for a material misrepresentation, and the law declines to
recind contracts for every instance of less than admirable behavior which would result
in nullifying many contracts, the performance of which would benefit society.
356.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 19, at 162. However, Pufendorf continued,
"when they have broken out into external actions, the internal action of the mind is
most carefully regarded in aggravating or mitigating the crime." Id. See also AQUINAS,
supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 4, at 998 ("[M]an is not competent to judge of interior
movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear.").
357.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 18, at 161.
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Where human law does not enforce natural law, obligation to
natural law persists even though its disregard is not attended by a
civil penalty. Pufendorf explained:
For these two conditions are not mutually at variance, namely, that a
thing is forbidden by the law of nature, and permitted by civil laws.
For the permission of the civil law does not prevent a certain act from
being contrary to the law of nature, or allow one to commit it without
sinning against God; but it merely declares that, by civil authority, the
one who desires to commit the act is neither prevented from doing so,
nor punished, and that in a human court of law those acts are granted
the effects which otherwise attend also upon acts that are licit and
358
legitimate on the basis of the law of nature.

Aquinas wrote, "In order, therefore, that no evil might remain
unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to
supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden. '359 A prohibition by divine
law or natural law not enforced civilly still "obligates men, indeed...
but the prosecution is left solely to the divine judgement-seat and to
'360
one's own consciousness of having violated that law.
Provisionally, ethics and integrity are of particular consequence at
the margins where civil law cannot enforce natural law consistently,
and beyond those margins where civil law is powerless to enforce
3 61
natural law.
As civil law cannot enforce all natural law, a selection must be
made between natural law obligations competing for human
enforcement resources, and two criteria for making such a
determination are (1) proximity of the proposed obligation to natural
law, or relative importance of the obligation, and (2) whether a decent
society and peace can be maintained without civil enforcement. First,
Pufendorf noted that conclusions "can be deduced from the principles
sometimes more clearly, sometimes less so; some also are closer to the

358.
Id. § 7, at 152.
359.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 91 art. 4, at 998.
360.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 18, at 160. See also supra note 241 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of the conscience). Pufendorf explained:
Now, just as the law of nature has the efficacy of an obligation from the most
exalted lawgiver, God, in such wise that he who has violated it should be
thought to have contravened God's own will, so there is no doubt but it rests
with Him to punish the violation of the law of nature as such.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 17, at 160. See also Matthew 12:36 ('But I tell you,' said
Jesus, 'that men will have to give account on the day of judgment for every careless
word they have spoken."'); 2 Corinthians 5:10 ('For we must all appear before the
judgment seat of Christ,' the apostle Paul wrote, 'that each one may receive what is due
him for the things done while in the body, whether good or bad."').
361.
See, e.g., PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. I, ch. VI, § XV, at 74 ("Regard is
likewise always to be had to natural Law, or to common Honesty, which is the
perpetual Supplement of civil Decrees.").
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same, others more remote. '362 The proximity of a certain civil
obligation to natural law determines the relative importance of
enforcement of that obligation, because some obligations are direct
requirements of natural law while others are more remotely derived
from natural law principles.
Blackstone's distinction between an act mala in se363 and an act
mala prohibita364 provides the two extremes for a continuum-like
array of obligation based upon strength of relationship to natural law.
Acts mala in se are "public mischief or private injury" offenses that
bind the conscience because of superior laws, or natural law, existing
even before human laws. 365 Pufendorf discussed certain absolute
precepts of the law of nature that "obligate all men whatsoever in any
state whatsoever." 366 For example, the nearly unanimously accepted
doctrine of jus cogens (peremptory norms) derives from the communis
opinio juris (generally accepted belief about a point of law). 367 States
are obligated to these "mandatory norm[s] of general international
law from which no two or more nations may exempt themselves or
release one another, '368 and peremptory norms override all treaties or
customary rules that conflict with them pursuant to Article 53 of the
1969 Vienna Convention.36 9 These beliefs have been described as
"deeply-held
and
widely
shared
conviction[s]
about
the
unacceptability of the [proscribed] conduct," aspects of social reality
"that cannot be ignored," and "elementary considerations of humanity
and fundamental general principles of humanitarian law."3 70 A
violation of jus cogens easily constitutes an act mala in se within
Blackstone's definition. Also fitting easily within the mala in se
category are things "so bad that they are not to be done even for the
sake of saving our country."'371 However, acts mala in se are not
limited to such alarming and large-scale acts, and include such things

362.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 16, at 159.
363.
Malum in se is latin for "evil in itself," and is defined as a "crime or an act
that is inherently immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
971 (7th ed. 1999).
364.
Malum prohibitum is latin for "prohibited evil," and is defined as an "act
that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not
necessarily immoral," such as jaywalking. Id.
365.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *57.
366.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 16, at 159.
367.
DEGAN, supra note 250, at 217, 219; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 273 (7th ed.
1999).
368.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999).
Jus cogens means
"compelling law" in English. Id.
369.
DEGAN, supra note 250, at 217-18, 226 (quoting Article 53 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Jus cogens obligations are not vitiated by
their non-observance. Id. at 221 (quoting Oscar Schachter).
370.
Id. at 217 (quoting Oscar Schachter); see also id. at 222 n.77. Violations of
jus cogens are international crimes such as slavery, racial discrimination and genocide.
Id. at 221 (quoting an ICJ opinion).
371.
GROTIUS, supra note 233, 23, at xxix (quoting Cicero).
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as murder, theft, and any other act that is directly binding upon the
conscience because of natural law or divine law.
Blackstone distinguished acts mala in se from acts mala
prohibita. The occasion of civil laws, Grotius wrote, is to "regard the
Utility of that Community," and those who prescribe laws for others
"aim, or ought to aim, at some Utility, to be produced to them for
whom they legislate. '3 72 Mala prohibita offenses seek the utility of
the community and are "purely penal, where the thing forbidden or
enjoined is wholly a matter of indifference, and where the penalty
inflicted is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience
supposed to arise from the offense. '373 Citizens are directed either to
"abstain from this, or submit to such a penalty. ' 374 Less moral guilt
results from violating a law of the mala prohibita type than from
violating a law of the mala in se type. 375 Mala in se offenses are
wrong because of their intrinsic characteristics and bear a closer
relationship to the natural law that prohibits them; mala prohibita
offenses that are only binding upon the conscience because of the
376
social pact and duty to obey authority.
In the same way as acts mala prohibita, other particulars of
human law rank low on the continuum of relative importance.
Natural law does not specify every detail required for the
administration of a civil society, nor does it expressly determine "just
which one is to rule the other, or which ought to obey, and also does
not mark the extent to which punishment is to be inflicted among
men." 377 Aquinas also noted that "the law of nature has it that the
evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that
way, is a determination of the law of nature ...[which has] no other
force than that of human law. '378 Civil laws must specify such
particulars:

372.
Id.
16-17, at xxvii.
373.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *58 (providing the examples of "killing a
hare," "possessing a Partridge in August," or "innumerable other positive
misdemeanors").
374.
Id. Blackstone explained that "prohibitory laws" do not create a sin out of a
violation, and "the only obligation in conscience is to submit to the penalty, if levied."
Id; see also infra note 378 (discussing in detail the obligation in conscience to just
government).
375.
See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 215, at *58; see also infra note 378.
376.
See infra note 378.
377.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 17, at 160.
378.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 95 art. 2, at 1015. Pufendorf also discussed
certain things that derive their force only "from the will of those who establish them."
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 15, at 158. Still, natural law does lend force to human
laws even if they are not natural laws per se, and the force behind obedience to
government does not rest solely in the ability of government to enforce penalties.
For those who had joined any community, or put themselves in subjection to
any man or men, those either expressly promised, or from the nature of the
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[A]lthough by a law of nature, as it were, theft, homicide, adultery, &c.,
are forbidden, nevertheless, it is in the province of civil laws to define
what is another's, what is one's own, what force it may be permissible
to employ against a man, and just what kind of sexual connexion
379
constitutes adultery.

Some human law specifies how a civil system will operationalize
natural law, and such specific details cannot usually muster enough
importance to justify their uniformity across the world.
The relative importance of a natural law obligation might also be
influenced by other principles implicated in particular facts. An
obligation might be concerned with several principles simultaneously,

case must have been understood to promise tacitly, that they would conform to
that which either the majority of the community, or those to whom the power
was assigned, should determine.
GROTIUS, supra note 233, 15, at xxvii. Pufendorf also wrote about the "social pact,"
whereby men obligate themselves to obey the "supreme command" of the state, which
is a moral precept. See supra text accompanying note 324. Locke explained that
without the binding force of natural law, no human positive law could be binding
because such laws "derive their whole force from the constraining power of natural law,
certainly so far as the majority of men is concerned." LOCKE, supra note 231, ch. VI, at
189.
[I]f you abolish the law of nature among them, you banish from among
mankind at the same time the whole body politic, all authority, order, and
fellowship among them. For we should not obey a king just out of fear,
because, being more powerful, he can constrain ... , but for conscience' sake,
because a king has command over us by right.
Id. The right of the king to command derives from his superior societal position,
conferred by a delegation of authority from God, which obligates the king's subjects to
the king "by the will of God." Id. at 187. The principle is also reflected in divine law,
as is demonstrated in Matthew 22:21 (where Jesus directed the Pharisees to "Give to
Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's.") and in Romans 13:6 (where Paul
explained, "This is why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God's servants, who give
their full time to governing."). It is for these reasons that the "ethical writers," as
Blackstone pointed out, observed that human laws are still "binding upon men's
consciences" even where the laws do not directly mirror natural law. 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 215, at *57. See also id. at *41 ("[N]o human laws are of any validity, if
contrary to this law of nature]; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and
all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."). If the will of the
government were the only source of obligation to a particular civil law, it would mean
that the conscience could not be bound to the law because the government was either
attempting to compel citizens to do something forbidden by natural law or to give up
doing something natural law orders. If that be the case, obedience would not be
morally due the state, and the government might not be able to sustain its influence for
long. See supra discussion accompanying notes 322-27.
More precisely stated,
therefore, certain human laws only become binding because of the will of a human
legislature, but once promulgated, they receive the binding force of natural law as long
as they are just. See supra text accompanying note 352; supra text accompanying
notes 325-26; supra note 327 and accompanying text. Therefore, the legislative goal is
to "link[ ] Force in the same yoke with Law." GROTrUS, supra note 233,
19, at xxvii
(quoting Solon).
379.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 6, at 150.
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all of which might bear different relationships to natural law in the
sense that each principle is more or less strongly implicated in the
particular context. The several principles implicated might each tend
toward different outcomes.
To illustrate this effect, Dworkin
discussed the logical distinction between principles and rules which
"differ in the character of the direction they give. '38 0 Rules operate
on an "all-or-nothing" basis, because they are either valid and
operative on given sets of facts or they are not. 381 Principles, on the
other hand, "seem very different" from rules, because legal
consequences do not automatically follow from them. 38 2 Unlike rules,
principles do not set out preconditions that compel their application,
but rather state reasons that argue in one direction without requiring
a particular decision. 38 3 Principles have a dimension of "weight or
importance" that rules do not, because principles may "intersect"
without invalidating each other. 38 4 Thus, one principle implicated in
a particular scenario might add or subtract weight from another
principle, which affects the relative importance of the latter principle
38 5
and also the decision whether to enforce the obligation.

380.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977).
381.
Id. at 24-25 (providing examples of speed limits or the requirement of three
witnesses in signing a will, which are attended automatically with legal consequences).
Although exceptions may exist to rules, such as when the baseball catcher drops the
third strike (such that the batter is not out), the exceptions are incorporated into the
character of the rule and can be listed in an accurate and complete statement of the
rule. Id.
382.
Id. (illustrating with the principle that "no man may profit from his own
wrong," which does not mean "the law never permits a man to profit from wrongs he
commits," as in the case of adverse possession where an initial wrong of trespass ripens
into a legally recognized right over time, or where breaking an employment contract for
a higher paying job will not require the employee to forego his new salary).
383.
Id. at 26 (noting that principles are things that the law will "take into
account").
384.
Id. at 26-27. To illustrate how principles intersect without invalidating
each other, consider Kansas v.Colorado, where the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
[W]henever ...the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural
laws into the territory of another State, the question of the extent and the
limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a matter of justiciable
dispute between them, and this court is called upon to settle that dispute in
such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time
establish justice between them.
206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907), quoted in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1024
n.8 (1983).
385.
For example, a court will extend comity to the judicial acts of another
nation where "it is shown that the foreign court is a court of competent jurisdiction,
and that the laws and public policy of the forum state and the rights of its residents
will not be violated," and as long as "fundamental standards of procedural fairness"
have been followed by the foreign court. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. A.B.,
773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985), quoted in Int'l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research
Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Supreme Court Justice Gray described
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The second critical factor in determining whether to enforce an
obligation of natural law is whether a decent society and peace can be
maintained without enforcement. Too much civil permission might
disrupt what would be a peaceful and decent society. An overlynarrow definition of theft, for example, might diverge too far from
dictates of natural law.
Thus some author or other reports of the Tartars that it was a custom
among them for one who had taken something away from a second
person, merely to give as an excuse to the judge that he needed it, and
the judge would render this decision: "Because you had need, keep it;
and so you of the other party, if you shall likewise need anything, you
will be allowed to take it from another person in the same way."
Therefore, by Tartar definition, it will be theft when something is taken
from its owner, against his will, which was not needed by the one who
took it. Yet one can scarcely doubt that the narrowness of this
38 6
definition all but utterly overturns that law of nature about theft.

Such a narrow definition of theft extending too much civil permission
to violate natural law would eventually frustrate the goals of a civil
society,
And surely no one, in my judgement, would wish for such a law, since it
might very frequently happen that he himself would be robbed of that
which was the last thing in the world that he would be willing to part
with, and whose like he could not find in the possession of another, or
else, because its owner watched over it, would be prevented from
carrying off.387

As another example from U.S. history, no amount of objection
prevented slave owners from treating slaves unjustly, and citizens
were free to disregard the dictates of natural law with impunity-at
least without penalty administered by the government. As Pufendorf
discussed, "that every Man should esteem and treat another as one
who is naturally his Equal, or who is a Man as well as he" is a
command of natural law.3 88 Eventually, a decent society and peace

comity as "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895),
quoted in Horphag, 257 F.3d at 1328 (citing In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93
F.3d 1036, 1046 (2d Cir. 1996)). Thus, the principle of fairness might subtract from the
force of obligation attributed to the principle of comity, and thereby decreases the
relative importance of extending comity.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 6, at 151. See also id. at 150 (giving an
386.
example of Lacedemonian boys who "secretly stole the property of other persons,
nevertheless they did not commit theft, because the civil law had defined that a thing
taken in that fashion was not another's," and was a "legitimate mode of acquisition").
Id. at 151.
387.
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, bk. III, ch. II, § I, at 224 (italics omitted). The
388.
principles listed in notes 267-82 also militate against holding slaves against their
consent. Some people discounted the humanity of slaves, even for representation
purposes, which can be seen as a way of trying to avert natural law obligation because
natural law requires different things for the treatment of humans and animals. See,
e.g., supra note 236.
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could not be maintained without enforcing natural law in the area of
slavery. Even regarding more borderline activities, 38 9 whether a
magistracy may "rightly permit" something prohibited by natural law
depends upon whether, "without punishment of this kind, a decent
390
society and peace cannot be maintained among men."
If a decent society and peace can be maintained without
enforcement, a magistracy cannot be blamed for failing "to ratify by a
civil penalty some precept of the law of nature, because it foresaw
that a greater inconvenience would result from so doing than if every
391
one whatsoever be left to his own conscience in that matter."
Aquinas explained that "many things are permissible to men not
392
perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man."
However, human law must be framed to apply to both the virtuous
and those not perfect in virtue, which is most of society.
Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous
abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for
the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others,
without the prohibition of which human society could not be
39 3
maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and suchlike.

Rather than trying to prohibit all vices from which the virtuous
abstain, the magistracy might sometimes be required to attend only

389.
An example of a "borderline activity" is civil permission for the
impregnation of a man's wife with his consent. First, the prohibition against adultery
is simultaneously part of the natural law and divine law. See Exodus 20:14 ("You shall
not commit adultery."). Some societies have prohibited it strictly, others more loosely.
One society discussed by Pufendorf permitted an "impotent old man to substitute some
vigorous young man in order to get his wife with child," and in that society, such
activity was not considered adultery because "the civil laws did not include under the
head of adultery such sexual connexion with another man's wife at the instigation of
the husband himself." PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 6, at 150. Here, civil law did not
punish the activity, assuming an agreement were demonstrable, and viewed children
produced from such activity as legitimate. Id. at 152.
390.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 7, at 152. See also supra note 275 (quoting
Pufendorf).
Id. at 162. See also PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 18, at 162; id. § 7, at 152
391.
(explaining that civil authority is not bound to exact such punishment); AQUINAS,
supra note 214, Q. 96 art. 2, at 1018 (quoting Augustine, who wrote, "The law which is
framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that
are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything,
is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does." (italics omitted)).
392.
AQUINAS, supra note 214, Q. 96 art. 2, at 1018 ("[M]any things are
permitted to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to
blame.").
Id. Along these lines, Pufendorf noted the benefit of leaving some matters
393.
of natural law unenforced civilly in order to "leave good men a large share of their
praise, as it were, unimpaired, the praise, namely, for having done right solely out of
reverence for the Deity." PUFENDORF, supra note 226, § 18, at 161. Pufendorf
continued, "And this praise disappears where it is impossible to discern whether one
has done right out of fear of punishment, or solely from love of right." Id.
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to matters posing a threat to public tranquility, such as where,
without enforcement, "the internal tranquillity of the commonwealth
could not exist at all. ' 394 Such a determination might rely on the
"peculiar disposition of the citizens. 3 9 5 In summary, a determination
of whether to enforce a natural law obligation civilly can be made
based on the relative importance of the obligation and whether a
decent society and peace can be maintained without civil
enforcement.

VIII. ANALYSIS

In their letter to President Bush, U.S. Senators Arlen Specter,
Charles Schumer, Herb Kohl, Strom Thurmond, and Mike DeWine
suggested that the Bush Administration might sue OPEC before the
ICJ at the Hague. 396 OPEC should not be sued in the ICJ at the
current time for the following reasons.
In the context of the natural law framework elucidated above,
antitrust is a form of law promulgated and enforced by human
sovereigns that seeks to reinforce dictates of natural law. Antitrust
enforcement is one method among many of attempting to buttress the
natural law principles of doing that which one would want done to
himself; preserving and cultivating social relations among one
another; promoting peace and seeking the common good; practicing
equity; and, with regard to international relationships, doing the
most possible good to other nations in times of peace. 39 7 In the
particular application of economic policy, antitrust law promotes fair
dealing and justice by preventing behavior that tends to lead to
unfair results for consumers and minimizing power discrepancies to
protect a competitive market, economic freedom, and economic
prosperity for all nations. 398
Antitrust law indirectly preserves
harmony and peace among citizens, facilitating the smooth
functioning of society and encouraging good will. 399 All countries are
bound to observe the foregoing principles regardless of human
enforcement, 40 0 and such principles link force in the same yoke with

394.
PUFENDORF, supra note 226, §§ 18-19, at 161-62 (explaining that civil
authority should not be disturbed "on account of things from which ...there is no
danger to the public tranquillity").
395.
Id. § 7, at 152.
396.
OPEC and Antitrust Law, supra note 2.
397.
See supra notes 267-82 and accompanying text (discussing concepts of
natural law).
398.
See, e.g., supra Part VI; supranote 199.
399.
See, e.g., supra note 192 (discussing universal reprobation of the system in
the face of power imbalances).
400.
See, e.g., supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text (presenting the
methods in which natural law binds).
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antitrust law. 40 1 Antitrust law is a contextual application of natural
law in the form of human law, also subject to the potential
40 2
deficiencies of natural law application.
Whether to reinforce natural law with human law punishments
depends on the policy factors for enforcing natural law: relative
importance of the obligation and whether a decent society and peace
can be maintained without enforcement.40 3 On the continuum of
relative importance of natural law obligation, antitrust law does not
rise to a direct prescription from natural law because violations are
not as intuitively binding upon the conscience 40 4 as other, more direct
violations such as murder, theft, or genocide that do not require
variable policy input.405 On the other hand, antitrust is not merely
mala prohibita because of the fundamental natural law principles
propelling competition policy; natural law binds the conscience on
40 6
more grounds than the social pact and duty to obey government,
and sovereigns are, or should be, aware of their duties to other
sovereigns.
Initially, antitrust law appears to occupy a middle
position on the continuum of relative importance.
Antitrust's middle position on the continuum is altered by the
distinction between humanitarian concerns and economic concerns.
Economic rights do not receive the same level of civil protection as
human and political rights, such as free speech, 40 7 and antitrust
policy
primarily
concerns
economic
freedom
rather than
humanitarian freedom.
Domestically, the less critical nature of
40 8
economic rights would equate to fewer concerns over regulation.
But internationally, co-equal sovereigns have the right to selfpreservation and survival, the right to independence, and the right to
be respected. 40 9 Currently, OPEC nations are attempting to preserve
their own economic prosperity by agreeing to increase market prices
for an economically critical export, and requiring OPEC nations to
discontinue price fixing would involve a change of behavior to which
OPEC nations might not consent.
The relative importance of
enforcing international antitrust policy is decreased because the
weaker concern over economic freedom also weakens the relative

401.
See supra note 378 (discussing the force behind human law).
402.
See supra note 349 (describing contextual applications of natural law);
supra text accompanying notes 341-45 (listing potential obstacles to correct application
of natural law).
403.
See supra Part VII.C.
404.
See supra notes 241, 378 (discussing the binding of the conscience).
405.
See, e.g., supra Part IV (highlighting several variations on antitrust policy).
406.
See supra note 378.
407.
See supra text accompanying notes 128-31 (citing Ross).
408.
See supra text accompanying note 130.
409.
DEGAN, supra note 250, at 84 (synthesizing and enumerating the
fundamental rights of states).
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importance of compelling OPEC nations to refrain from price
fixing. 4 10 The position of the obligation on the continuum is thus
shifted toward mala prohibita violations, making the obligation less
useful for international enforcement because of its more specific
applications.
Since antitrust law is human law and its enforcement contains
details relevant to particular communities, 411 the international
system needs reviewing authority to implement antitrust on a global
scale. The happiness and success of the international community are
"bound up" with maintaining consistency with natural law, and not
maintaining such consistency "beats down the bulwark of its own
tranquillity for future time. '412 A U.S. court might not deem a
restraint of trade appearing illegal on its face as unreasonable where
it does not result in the evils that the Sherman Act was intended to
prevent, and the restraint would thus be permitted. 413 The Supreme
Court has reviewed restraints by considering all relevant facts and
principles and has treated parties fairly while upholding the essential
purpose of the Sherman Act-even when precedent has seemed to
compel a contrary result. 414 The very nature of observing principles,
such as those behind antitrust law, requires a balanced approach and
right reason. 4 15 Presumably, the ICJ or other specially-established
tribunal could provide reviewing authority in some instances.
However, in the case of antitrust, intervention authority would
also be needed. Although OPEC-styled price fixing is arguably the
simplest aspect of antitrust law that is most amenable to consensus,
even a rigid rule against price fixing would not work on an
international scale without an international authority akin to the
U.S. Congress. 416 Congress has recognized that competition should
not be protected to the point of destroying the industry concerned,
which would not benefit consumers, and has ensured fairness by
intervening where industries could not legally relieve themselves
from a volatile market situation. 417 In Block v. Community Nutrition
Institute, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case regarding the

410.
Antitrust does not fall within the ambit of jus cogens, either. See supra
notes 367-70 and accompanying text.
411.
See, e.g., supra Part IV (suggesting some of the details of antitrust that
may vary by community).
412.
Supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text (quoting Grotius and
Pufendorf).
413.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
414.
See supra note 294 (discussing the need for equity and the court's role in
applying it).
415.
Supra notes 382-85 and accompanying text.
416.
Even if workable, picking and choosing portions of antitrust law to enforce
internationally, such as price-fixing, would leave a confusing patchwork pattern of
protection for consumers.
417.
See, e.g., supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing the market
problem in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)).
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Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.418 As the Court
explained, dairy farmers in the early 1900s "engaged in intense
competition in the production of fluid milk products," which
precipitated the need to "bring this destabilizing competition under
control.' 4 19 The 1937 Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to
set the minimum prices that milk handlers were required to pay to
milk producers for their milk products. 420 By setting a minimum
price for milk, Congress relieved milk producers from the harsh
effects of fluctuating milk prices that jeopardized the production of a
household staple.
Oil exporting nations experienced similar
destabilizing competition in 1998 when the price per barrel of oil
crashed to ten dollars per barrel, and such a predicament could
seriously hinder the export of one of the world's most critical natural
resources long term. 4 21 Without OPEC agreements, an international
body might eventually need to implement a prodedure to establish a
minimum price to protect petroleum exporting countries just as the
United States has protected dairy farmers.
The need for such
monitoring and intervention would require a new quasi-legislative
body that could issue binding policies, 422 and such a body is not
currently in place. 423 Thus, a successful suit before the ICJ enjoining
OPEC from price fixing would be premature at best and might even
detract from the international public good in the long run. Generally,
sufficient structures must be in place to implement antitrust law such
that it does not become oppressive, contrary to the public interest, or
inconsistent with natural law, but a governmental structure like that
of the United States is much more difficult on an international level
424
when dealing with equal sovereigns.

418.
Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 340 (1984) (discussing the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-08 (1937)).
419.
Block, 467 U.S. at 341.
420.
Id. at 341-42 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 608c). The Act established several checks
and balances to ensure the set price was fairly determined, considering the interests of
all parties. See id.
421.
See supra text accompanying note 26.
422.
E.g., Monti, Speech at the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 94, at
2 (calling for international governance of markets in the form of an independent agency
that enforces antitrust policies under the supervision of the judiciary).
423.
U.S. Assistant Attorney General Charles James, U.S. Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Tim Muris, European Commission Commissioner Mario Monti,
and Director of Investigation and Research for the Canadian Competition Bureau
Konrad von Finckenstein were hoping to launch a "Global Competition Network"
(GCN) as early as Spring 2002, but the GCN's guidelines would be non-binding "best
practices" recommendations. James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address,
supra note 95, at 6.
424.

E.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND

READINGS 3 (Edward Collins, Jr. ed., 1970) (discussing the lack of an international
police force, an international court with compulsory jurisdiction, or a world legislature
that may promulgate civil laws binding the world community).
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Even if an international structure with power to set minimum
prices for the international community could be implemented (such as
by having adequate representation from each sovereign), the effort
might be unjustifiable because a decent society and peace can
probably be maintained. Whether a decent society and peace can be
maintained is a function of the tendencies of the world community.
Besides the rapid advances of antitrust legislation world-wide, the
number of international conferences for exploring and perfecting
425
antitrust policy has increased exponentially in the last few years.
The augmenting international pressure against anti-competitive
practices due to the recent explosion in antitrust activity might
eventually provide sufficient protection against unduly powerful
organizations and countries not subject to antitrust law or antitrust
conventions. 42 6 According to one author, the possibility of incurring
sanctions, economic pressures, blockades, and even war could be
compelling motivations for sovereigns to observe principles supported
by the majority of the international community. 4 27 International
enforcement of antitrust in such a context might be unjustifiably
onerous, and the international community could not be blamed for
declining to engage international resources in such a way.
International trends have also begun to take their toll on OPEC
itself, whose power might be vulnerable to defection. Venezuela and
Indonesia might follow the lead of Gabon, which withdrew its
membership in 1995 after having enacted antitrust legislation in
1989.428 Venezuela and Indonesia enacted antitrust legislation in
429
1999 and 1991, but have not yet withdrawn from OPEC practices.
The Venezuelan government has also released information about

425.
See supra Part V.
426.
See supra note 213 1 (discussing antitrust agreements). Each sovereign
needs time to work out the details associated with implementing antitrust legislation,
because a major percentage of the world community has relatively little experience.
See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text. Indonesia reported that "competition
practice is a new thing in Indonesia," and highlighted the importance of learning by
doing.
Contribution from Indonesia at the Second OECD Global Forum on
Competition, supra note 200, at 8.
See also Report of the Expert Meeting on
Competitiveness (U.N. Trade and Development Board), supra note 4, at 12 ("[D]ifferent
countries [are] at different stages of implementation of consumer policy."). See also
James, OECD Global Forum on Competition Address, supra note 95, at 2; Ricupero,
Statement to the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 147, para. 6 (describing
James' and Ricupero's discussion of the continuing struggle with practical dilemmas of
implementing and enforcing anti-cartel policy and competition legislation).
427.
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ACHANGING WORLD, supra note 424, at 37.
428.
See supra note 7.
429.
See supra notes 7, 142. Venezuela prohibits "all the conducts, practices,
agreements, etc. that impede, restrict, falsify or limit the free competition."
Venezuela's Free Competition System, supra note 198, at 2. See also supra text
accompanying notes 200-07 (discussing the history of Indonesia's economy and its need
for competition legislation).
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illegal price-fixing to the general public via the Internet. 430 Algeria
demonstrated interest in competition policy by attending the second
OECD Global Forum on Competition in 2002, along with Venezuela
and Indonesia who also attended and contributed papers to the first
OECD Global Forum on Competition. 431 All OPEC nations, including
Venezuela and Indonesia, are members of both UNCTAD and the
U.N. Trade and Development Board and might be increasingly
influenced by UNCTAD's Model Law on Competition that condemns
OPEC practices. 432 The OPEC Conference pointed to a 1975 "Solemn
Declaration," expressing interest in establishing "a new international
economic order based on justice, mutual understanding and a genuine
concern for the well-being of all peoples," as evidence that OPEC has
'43 3
promoted the "ideals" of the U.N. "throughout [OPEC's] existence.
OPEC members Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Indonesia
attended and participated in a U.N. Trade and Development Board
expert meeting on consumer interests, competitiveness, competition,
and development-demonstrating that the trend of recognizing the
importance of competition policy is not restricted to non-OPEC
nations. 43 4 Along with augmenting international influence, the steps

430.
The Venezuelan government, in Spanish, has posted a question and answer
bulletin on horizontal price fixing agreements on their website. Pro Competencia, Ley para
Promover y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre Competencia, at http://www.procompetencia.
gov.ve/ley.html#6quesonah. As translated by the author, the website explains horizontal
agreements as agreements made "between competitors that debilitate or restrict free
competition between enterprises in the same market." See id. Horizontal agreements, the
website explains, manifest themselves in the fixing of prices, restriction of production,
division of the market, and price predation. See id. Price fixing is described as "economic
agents fixing their prices by common agreement instead of establishing prices in an
independent and competitive way." See id.
431.
See supra notes 7, 175, 179; see also supra text accompanying notes 198,
200-07.
432.
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
UNCTAD's Membership, at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemID=1929
&lang=1; supra note 7 (listing OPEC nations); supra text accompanying notes 152, 155-59
(discussing the Model Law); Report of the Expert Meeting on Competitiveness (U.N. Trade
and Development Board), supra note 4, at 4 (recommending that enterprises conform to the
U.N. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles, particularly § D from which the
Model Law derives, as explained in note 160 and accompanying text, and congratulating
UNCTAD for its important and useful work in the field of competition policy and consumer
protection).
433.
OPEC GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 9, at 11. See also id. at 14
(expressing interest in promoting "international co-operation in achieving higher
standards of living for all nations, full employment, and economic and social progress
and development").
434.
See Report of the Expert Meeting on Competitiveness (U.N. Trade and
Development Board), supra note 4, at 16-17; see also supra note 7. Even if OPEC loses
no members, all economies might be able to accommodate any harm by OPEC in the
long-run if OPEC cannot maintain its price targets during economic booms or increases
in oil consumption that force oil-exporting nations to produce to their capacity, or if
non-OPEC nations increasingly elect not to participate in OPEC price agreements,
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Venezuela and Indonesia have already taken create a reasonable
likelihood that they might eventually withdraw from OPEC like
Gabon did, which might have a dramatic effect on OPEC because
Venezuela is a founding member, 435 and other OPEC nations have
demonstrated interest in competition policy as well. A decent society
and peace can probably be maintained.

IX. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Bush Administration should not bring an
action against OPEC before the ICJ, nor should the ICJ accept an
invitation to select and enforce specific antitrust policies. 4 36 Agreed
matters of antitrust law will always be the broader natural law
justifications for such policy, and a large portion of the international
community now desires enforcement of those principles in the context
of economic policy. However, strained international harmonization of
the more specific antitrust policy matters would create overly specific
guidelines for an overly large community, which would defeat the
purpose of human law to regard the utility of particular communities
and frustrate the goals of antitrust law. 43 7 Consequently, the need
for cooperation on antitrust matters should not be misconstrued as
the need for consensus, and any energy expended for antitrust
consensus would be unjustifiable due to the rapid advance of

increasing their own market shares. See Barrionuevo, supra note 26; see also supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
435.
See supra note 7. If both countries withdraw from OPEC, the market share
of OPEC will also decrease.
436.
Forcing uniform antitrust policy upon the world community might instigate
concerns noted by Grotius:
But this attempt to drive things too far, is often so far from succeeding, that it
does harm; because the excess which it involves is easily detected; and then,
detracts from the authority of what is said, even within the limits of truth. We
are to provide a remedy for both disorders; both for thinking that nothing is
allowable, and that everything is.
GROTIUS, supra note 233, 29, at xxxi.
437.
Aquinas wrote, "The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied
to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence
arises the diversity of positive laws among various people." AQUINAS, supra note 214,
Q. 95 art. 2, at 1015. See also id. Q. 97 art. 1, at 1023 ("[T]he natural law contains
certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain
particular precepts, according to various emergencies."); supra text accompanying note
372 (quoting Grotius on the purpose of human law); Report of the Expert Meeting on
Competitiveness (U.N. Trade and Development Board), supra note 4, at 12
("[C]onsumer protection policies differ[ ] among countries and this fact [has] to be
reflected in consumer protection laws."); supra Part IV (discussing different preferences
for antitrust enforcement).
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competition policy worldwide. 438
Currently, the international
community would be better served by attending to more direct
natural law requirements without the enforcement of which world
tranquility cannot be maintained at all, 439 to wit, international
terrorism, which has been of particular importance in the exhaustion
of international resources in recent months and the stated goal of the
Bush Administration. International actors can pursue the goal of
making antitrust law more effective internationally by increasing the
number and efficacy of international conventions and working
together to protect each others' citizens from anticompetitive
440
harms.
Joel Brandon Mooret

438.
See supra Part V.
439.
See, e.g., supra note 394 (quoting PufendorO; supra text accompanying note
393 (quoting Aquinas).
440.
See, e.g., Monti, Speech at the Global Forum on Competition, supra note 94,
at 3-4 (expressing concern for the inability of nations to protect their citizens from
anticompetitive behavior due to jurisdictional barriers); supra note 179 (discussing the
second OECD Global Forum on Competition, which explored avenues for cooperation in
antitrust investigations); supra note 213
1 (listing ways in which sovereigns are
currently working together on antitrust matters).
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